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In 1996, Teck Cominco Alaska, Inc. (Cominco) commenced an
expansion of one of its zinc mine holdings in rural Alaska.' Cominco
applied to the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation
(ADEC) for a permit authorizing increased generation by its standby
electric generator and the addition of a seventh generator to its mine.
2
Pursuant to its duties under the Clean Air Act (CAA),3 ADEC
initially chose selective catalytic reduction as the best available
control technology (BACT) for Cominco's generators.4  After
objections from Cominco,5 ADEC instead selected Low NOx as
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1. Alaska Dep't of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 124 S. Ct. 983, 994 (2004).
2. Id. at 994.
3. Id. at 997. The CAA indicates that no facility like Cominco's "may be
constructed or modified unless a permit prescribing emission limitations has been
issued for the facility." Id.
4. Id. at 994. Selective catalytic reduction is a pollution control technology
designed to reduce a combustion engine's production of nitrogen oxygen
pollutants. Id. n.5. The technology requires the use of relatively expensive metals
such as titanium, platinum, or vanadium as a catalyst. Id.
5. Cominco argued that selective catalytic reduction technology would be
unreasonably expensive, advocating instead that ADEC choose low NOx as BACT
for the generators. Id. at 995. Selective catalytic reduction, while expensive,
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BACT and issued the permit.6  The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) responded by ordering Cominco to cease installation
of the seventh generator, invalidating ADEC's permit for failure to
explain why the device originally determined to be BACT was not
the technology ultimately selected by the agency.8
The Court ultimately upheld the EPA's invalidation of the ADEC
permit.9 Finding the EPA authorized to review the reasonableness of
a state environmental agency's BACT determination, 10 the Court
held that the EPA's review of ADEC's permit process and the
substantive contents of Cominco's permit was within the scope of its
Congressionally mandated authority."'
This note will analyze the Court's decision in Alaska Department
of Environmental Conservation v. EPA and discuss its impact upon
the field of administrative law. Part II will briefly outline the history
of the CAA and the principles of administrative law at work in this
case. 12 Part III will introduce the particular facts of Alaska.13 Part IV
presents and discusses the Court's majority and dissenting opinions. 14
Part V discusses the impact of the Alaska decision, 15 and Part VI will
conclude the note.16
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Clean Air Act and Cooperative Federalism
Toward the end of the 1950's, there emerged a growing concern
would reduce nitrogen oxide emissions by ninety percent. Id. at 994. Low NOx,
substantially less expensive, would reduce emissions by only thirty percent. Id.
6. Id. at 997.
7. Id.
8. Id. The EPA's invalidation of the permit was due in large part to Cominco's
failure to offer any evidence to support its claim that the installation of selective
catalytic reduction would be technologically infeasible. See id. at 996.
9. Id. at 1009.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 17-137 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 138-166 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 167-312 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 313-338 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 339-341 and accompanying text.
over the health risks associated with air pollution. 7 In an attempt to
respond to that concern, Congress passed the first CAA in 1963.18
The 1963 CAA required that states take certain regulatory steps to
reduce air pollution, but it failed to provide for a national supervisory
agency that would ensure state compliance.1 9 As state reluctance to
comply with the provisions of the Act became increasingly clear,
20
Congress amended the CAA in 1970 with several provisions
designed to "take a stick to the states" and ensure compliance. 2' The
1976 Amendments invested the EPA with authority to penalize states
which failed to comply with the provisions of the act. 22 One of the
most significant features of the CAA is the Act's division of
enforcement responsibilities between the EPA and state governments.
While the EPA is charged with ensuring compliance, the CAA grants
states the discretion to choose the particular means by which the
17. Train v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 421 U.S. 60, 63 (1975).
18. Id. The original act "authorized federal authorities to expand their research
efforts, to make grants to state air pollution control agencies, and also to intervene
directly to abate interstate pollution in limited circumstances." Id. at 63-64.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 64. "The response of the States to these manifestations of increasing
congressional concern with air pollution was disappointing." Id.
21. Id. at 64. The 1970 amendments were the result of "congressional
dissatisfaction with the progress of existing air pollution programs and a
determination to 'tak[e] a stick to the States."' Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S.
246, 249. (1976), quoting Train, 421 U.S. at 64. The most significant change
produced by the amendments was the requirement that states submit plans for EPA
approval detailing how they would achieve the air quality standards promulgated
by the Act within three years. Id. at 250. The amendments required EPA approval
of the plans if they were adopted after public notice and hearing and met eight
specific criteria: provide for attainment of air quality standards as quickly as
possible; include emissions limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliances;
include provisions for establishing and operating mechanisms for monitoring and
analyzing ambient air quality; include a procedure for review of the location of new
sources subject to the Act's standards; contain adequate provisions for
intergovernmental cooperation; provide assurance that the state will have the
resources to carry out the implementation plan; provide for the periodic inspection
and testing of motor vehicles; and provide for revision of the plan after public
hearing. Id. at 252. The amendments further provide that an adopted plan may be
challenged in a court of appeals within thirty days of its adoption or thirty days
after "newly discovered or available information justifies subsequent review." Id. at
249.
22. Train, 421 U.S. at 64.
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Act's air quality criteria will be met.23 The CAA's careful balance of
federal oversight with state autonomy has often led to confusion
regarding the particular responsibilities and nuances of each party's
enforcement powers.
24
As state agencies began to enforce the provisions and
requirements of the act, conflict between environmental and
government agencies began to produce case law addressing the
balance of power between those and the guiding principles behind the
Act's enforcement.25  The case of Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Counsel (NRDC) is illustrative of that process.26 In Train,
an environmental advocacy group challenged the EPA's approval of
a state plan allowing particular pollution sources to be excused from
meeting certain pollution limitations prior to the state's attainment
date.2 Of central importance to the case was the amount of
discretion allotted to a state agency in selecting the particular means
by which it would achieve the nationally mandated standards. 28 In
upholding the state's implementation plan, the Court noted that "so
long as the ultimate effect of a State's choice of emission limitations
is compliance with national standards ...the State is at liberty to
23. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (2004). "Each State shall have the primary
responsibility for assuring air quality." Id.
24. See Train, 421 U.S. 60 (concerning the amount of discretion properly
afforded a state agency in determining how CAA requirements will be met);
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (concerning EPA
power to make policy decisions); and Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976)
(concerning the role of technological and economic considerations in approving a
state's implementation plan).
25. See Train, 421 U.S. 60.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 70. An attainment date represents the time at which the state has
reduced the quantity of pollutants such that the ambient air quality within its
territory satisfies national standards. Id. at 66. In Train, the NRDC challenged a
provision in Georgia's state implementation plan which allowed individually
tailored variances in pollution limitations. Id. at 69. Per the CAA, a state has three
years to attain the national standards for air quality once its implementation plan is
approved. Id. at 66. Of concern to the parties in Train was the stringency with
which emissions limitations should be enforced prior to the attainment date. Id. at
68.
28. Id. at 78. Noting that Train "reaches the broader issue of whether
Congress intended the States to retain any significant degree of control of the
manner in which they attain and maintain national standards." Id.
adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its
particular situation.,,29 The Court further noted that the requirements
of the CAA "relegate" the EPA to a "secondary role in the process of
determining and enforcing the specific" provisions of the Act.
30
B. Balancing Power and Delegating Authority
Since the emergence of the EPA as the agency invested with the
primary responsibility of ensuring national compliance with the
provisions of the CAA, several problems have arisen concerning the
manner in which the EPA interacts with state agencies charged with
the substantive details of ensuring state compliance. 3' The most
significant problem has concerned the proper forum and mechanism
for resolving conflicts between state agencies and the EPA over the
proper interpretation and enforcement of CAA provisions.3 2 Judicial
review and standards for agency deference have emerged as the usual
solution to such problems, 33 but the current solution merely
represents the cumulative impact of several significant decisions
addressing the proper division of power and responsibility between
federal and state agencies.
29. Id. at 79.
30. Id.
31. Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The Green Aspects of Printz: The Revival of
Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law, 6 GEO. MASON L. REv.
573, 620 (1998).
The 1970 court battles were hardly the last conflicts between the
federal and state governments over implementation of the Clean
Air Act. After passage of the 1990 Amendments, state and local
governments loudly protested EPA regulations on automobile
emission inspection programs, carpool regulations, and
permitting program requirements. More recently, states took the
EPA back to court, raising constitutional objections to its
uncooperative approach to "cooperative federalism."
Id.
32. See EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (providing EPA with unlimited
discretion in selecting which state implementation programs would be approved);
see also Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3rd Cir. 1974) (holding the
application of federal enforcement procedures to state non-compliance consistent
with federal commerce power).
33. See Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1006 n.16 (noting that "federal-court" review will
safeguard the "balance between State and Federal Governments"). Id.
Snrin2 2005 Admainistrative Sovereignty
274 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 25-1
In Union Electric v. EPA, the Court began addressing the balance
of enforcement powers by establishing the competency of state courts
to determine issues related to the economic and technological
feasibility of pollution limitations. 34 In Union Electric, the State of
Missouri applied for and received EPA approval of its state
implementation plan (SIP).35 The plan established a mechanism for
controlling sulfur dioxide emissions in and around St. Louis. 36 Since
the levels of sulfur dioxide exceeded national primary standards in
only one area, the plan focused on reducing sulfur dioxide emissions
in that particular region.37 Union Electric Company (Union Electric),
the region's primary source of electric power, operated three coal-
fired generators subject to pollution reductions. 38 Union Electric
applied for and received an exception to the pollution reduction
requirements from the appropriate state agency,39 subject to renewal
after a set period of time.40 When two of the applicable exceptions
had expired, the EPA notified the company that it was in violation of
Missouri's SIP.41 Union Electric sought review of the Missouri SIP
in federal court, arguing that the required pollution reductions were
not technologically or economically feasible.42 The Supreme Court
rejected the Union Electric's argument,43 finding the policy aims of
the Act necessarily of a "technology-forcing character., 44  After
34. 427 U.S. 146 at 252 (1976). The State's plan specifically addressed
control of sulfur dioxide emissions in and around St. Louis. Id. While the
provisions of the plan were effective immediately, the State retained the authority
to "grant variances to particular sources that could not immediately comply." Id.






40. Id. at 255.
41. Id. at 253.
42. Id. at 255.
43. See id. at 256. "Congress intended claims of economic and technological
infeasibility to be wholly foreign to the Administrator's consideration of a state
implementation plan." Id.
44. See id. at 257 (quoting Train, 421 U.S. at 90-91). The Court notes that the
1970 amendments to the Act were "a drastic remedy to what was perceived as a
serious and otherwise uncheckable problem of air pollution." Id. at 256.
determining that neither the EPA nor the federal judiciary had the
authority to determine the technological or economic feasibility of a
state's implementation plan,45 the Court cited state agencies as the
most appropriate forum for considering such claims.46 In so holding,
the Court began the process of defining the contours of the
relationship between state environmental agencies and the EPA in
enforcing the provisions of the CAA.
In its opinion in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, the
Court helped to clarify the appropriate balance of power between
state and federal administrative agencies in CAA enforcement by
defining the point at which Congressional delegation of enforcement
authority exceeds Constitutional bounds. 4 7  In Whitman, several
organizations representing the American trucking industry challenged
a new set of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)
adopted by the EPA.48 The organizations challenged the new
standards on the premise that EPA's adoption of revised NAAQS
violated the constitution as an exercise of legislative authority.
49
45. See id. at 256. The Court notes that the responsibility of the EPA is solely
to insure that the provisions of an approved plan are being satisfied and that the
plan meets the "minimum compliance requirements" of the Act. Id.
46. Id. at 267 (noting that industries denied exemptions from a state's
implementation plan should have recourse to state agencies and state courts). Id.
The Court further noted that a State may select "whatever mix of control devices it
desires" as long as the national standards established by the Act are satisfied. Id.
"[C]ongress plainly left with the States.. .the power to determine which sources
would be burdened by regulation and to what extent." Id. at 269.
47. Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
48. Id. at 463. The CAA requires that the EPA review its adopted NAAQS
every five years, making "such revisions ... as may be appropriate." 42 U.S.C. §
7409 (d)(1) (2004). In Whitman, the trucking organizations challenged new EPA
standards for particulate matter and ozone, both of which are the primary air
pollutants produced by cargo and transport vehicles. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 463.
49. Id. at 463. The Court notes that the proper analysis in such a challenge
centers on the degree to which the statute has delegated legislative power to the
agency. Id. at 472. Agencies are commonly understood to be part of the Executive
Branch. As such, the delegation of legislative powers to agencies raises
Constitutional issues. In order to avoid a Constitutional violation when conferring
decision making authority on agencies, Congress must "lay down by legislative act
an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed
to conform." Id. at 472 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). The Court goes on to note that the "degree of agency
discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power
Snrin 2005 Administrative Sovereignty
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They further argued that EPA was implicitly obligated to consider the
financial burdens on regulated entities prior to adopting revised
NAAQS. 50  After addressing the role of the EPA in enforcing the
CAA and the existence of standards to govern the exercise of the
agency's discretion, 51 the Court rejected the arguments proffered by
the trucking organizations and found the EPA's exercise of authority
to be within constitutional bounds. 52  The Court's holding is
significant in that it effectively established the circumstances under
which Congress may properly delegate complex policy decisions into
agency hands.53
Prior to its holding in Whitman, the Court's opinion in Idaho v.
Couer d'Alene Tribe of Idaho addressed the competency of State
courts to elaborate state administrative law and decide issues
concerning federal administrative agencies.54 In Idaho, a Native
American tribe challenged the State's determination of the tribe's
property boundaries.55 While a state forum was available to review
congressionally conferred." Id. at 475.
50. Id.
51. Based on the language of the Act itself, the Court notes that the EPA is to
"identify the maximum airborne concentration of a pollutant that the public health
can tolerate, decrease the concentration to provide an 'adequate' margin of safety,
and set the standard at that level." Id. at 466. The Court states that the language of
the act in no way requires that cost considerations play a part in that decision. Id.
Further, the Court notes that the EPA's exercise of discretion in determining
revised NAAQS is appropriately limited by the requirement that it choose
standards "requisite" for the protection of the public health. Id. at 476.
52. Id. at 476.
53. See id. at 475. "[Tlhe degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies
according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred .... But even in
sweeping regulatory schemes we have never demanded ... that statutes provide a
'determinate criterion' for saying 'how much [of the regulated harm] is too much."
Id. (quoting American Trucking Association v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (1999)).
The Whitman Court notes that the central question in a delegation challenge is
"whether the statute has delegated legislative power to the agency." Whitman, 531
U.S. at 472. In order for such delegation to be constitutionally acceptable,
"Congress must 'lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform."' Id. (quoting J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409 (1928)). Courts rarely find such a principle
lacking. Id. at 474.
54. See Idaho v. Couer d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
55. Id. at 264. The boundary dispute centered on whether the tribe possessed
land on the banks of various lakes and waterways as well as the lands submerged
those boundary issues, the tribe chose to bring the action in federal
court.56 The State moved to dismiss the tribe's claim on the grounds
that it had Eleventh Amendment immunity.57 Granting the motion
for dismissal, the majority opinion noted that the state's own courts
were competent to decide the federal issues which the tribe
presented.58 Citing the "elaboration of administrative law" as "one of
the primary responsibilities of the state judiciary," 59 the Court
implicitly legitimized the requirement that federal agencies challenge
state agency action in state forums.
60
Following its decision in Idaho, the majority in Alden v. Maine
further bolstered the competence of state courts to adjudicate federal
issues by establishing the presumption that states act in good faith
when interpreting and applying federal law.6 1  In Alden, several
probation officers filed suit in federal court against the State of
Maine, alleging that the state's overtime provisions violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938.62 The case was dismissed and re-filed
in state court, where it was dismissed again on the basis of Maine's
sovereign immunity.63  The United States Supreme Court granted
under the same. Id. The tribe challenged the State's claim of ownership to those
lands based on an un-extinguished aboriginal title. Id. at 265.
56. Id. at 265.
57. Id. at 266. The Eleventh Amendment provides that the "Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
The Court concluded that Native American tribes should be accorded the same
status as foreign sovereigns. Idaho, 521 U.S. at 268. As such, Idaho was entitled
to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity against the tribe. Id. at 269.
58. Id. at 288. "We do not for that reason conclude.., that state courts are a
less than adequate forum for resolving federal questions. A doctrine based on the
inherent inadequacy of state forums would run counter to [the] basic principles of
federalism." Id. at 275.
59. Id. at 276.
60. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1014.
61. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999). "We are unwilling to
assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of
the United States." Id. at 755.
62. Id. at 711. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 can be located at 29
U.S.C. § 201 (2004).
63. Id. at 712. The case was dismissed from federal court as a result of the
existing case law establishing that "Congress lacks power under Article I to
abrogate the State's sovereign immunity from suits commenced or prosecuted in
Spring 2005 Administrative Sovereignty
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certiorari to decide whether Congress had the authority to "subject
non-consenting States to private suits for damages in state courts."
64
Specifically recognizing the sovereign status of State governments,
65
the Court noted that a state's assertion of immunity requires an
analysis not of the primacy of federal law but instead of whether that
law was implemented in a "manner consistent with" state
sovereignty. 66  In addressing the importance of preserving the
sovereignty of a state within its own courts, the majority was careful
to note that a state's constitutional privilege does not provide it with a
"concomitant right to disregard the Constitution or valid federal
law." 67 While the Alden Court ultimately upheld Maine's exercise of
immunity, it implicitly established a judicial presumption that states
will "honor the Constitution" and "obey the binding the laws" of the
federal government. 68 That presumption is important in addressing
the concern that states will disregard federal law in the absence of a
federal supervisorial authority.
69
the federal courts." Id. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
64. Id. at 712.
65. Id. at 713. "Although the Constitution establishes a National Government
with broad, often plenary authority over matters within its recognized competence,
the founding document 'specifically recognizes the States as sovereign entities."'
Id. (quoting Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. at 71 n. 15).
66. Id. at 732. The Court further "reject[s] any contention that substantive
federal law by its own force necessarily overrides the sovereign immunity of the
states." Id.
67. Id. at 755. The Court ultimately held that States "retain immunity from
private suit in their own courts," based on a recognition that "[The] Constitution of
the United States ... recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of
the States-independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial
departments." Id. at 754 (quoting Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78
(1938)).
68. See id. at 755. The presumption occurs in its original form as a negative:
"We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or
obey the binding laws of the United States. The good faith of the States thus
provides an important assurance." Id. The existence of the presumption is
confirmed by Justice Kennedy in his dissenting opinion in ADEC: "EPA and amici
... fail to overcome the established presumption that States act in good faith."
Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1012 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
69. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1001. "Federal agency surveillance of a State's
BACT designation is needed, EPA asserts, to restrain the interjurisdictional
pressures to which Congress was alert." Id. Those pressures include the danger
that States with more rigorous enforcement procedures would "lose existing
The federal concern with state agencies failing to act in good
faith when interpreting federal regulations is reciprocated by the
concern of state and private entities with the equitable problems
arising from a federal agency's unreasonable delay in exercising its
supervisorial authority.7 0 In the context of EPA enforcement of CAA
provisions, few examples of such delay exist.71 United States v. AM
General Corporation represents one of the few such instances.72 In
AM General Corporation, a manufacturer of Hummer army vehicles
obtained a state permit for an expansion of its facility that would
significantly increase its production of regulated pollutants.73 AM
General Corporation proceeded with its expansion after obtaining the
permit, but was notified four months later by the EPA that it was in
violation of the CAA due to a technical defect in the requirements of
the permit. 74 The EPA filed suit seeking the maximum penalty
against AM General Corporation, a penalty amounting to more than
$60 million in fines.75 In analyzing the EPA's claim, the court cited
EPA's failure to seek review of the permit in state forums and
ultimately rejected its argument based on the inequitable
industrial plants to more permissive states." Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, p.
134 (1977)).
70. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1005. ADEC raises this concern by suggesting that in
the absence of state courts acting as "the exclusive judicial arbiters, EPA would be
free to invalidate a BACT determination 'months, even years, after a permit has
been issued."' Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner 35).
71. Id. at 1005-06. The Court in Alaska was able to find only one such
instance of untimely agency enforcement. Id. See United States v. AM Gen.
Corp., 34 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1994).
72. AM Gen. Corp., 34 F.3d at 472 (1994).
73. Id. at 473. AM General Corporation applied a protective painting to its
Hummer vehicles using a process that produced significant quantities of ground-
level ozone. Id. The county in which AM General Corporation was located was a
non-attainment area under the CAA, so any increase in pollution output was
forbidden. Id. Even so, AM General Corporation applied for and obtained a
permit authorizing an expansion of its pollution output pending the re-classification
of its county as an attainment area. Id. The issuance of the regional body's permit
was done over the objection of the EPA. Id.
74. Id. at 473. The EPA found the permit to be invalid because it failed to
require AM General Corporation "either to achieve the lowest achievable rate of
emissions or to offset any increased emissions" as required by Indiana's approved
SIP. Id.
75. Id. at 474.
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consequences of its delayed challenge to the issued permit.76
Significantly, AM General Corporation reiterates the competence of
state courts to hear federal agency challenges to state agency action. 7
In addition, it addresses the potential consequences of unreasonable
delay in the exercise of a federal administrative agency's
supervisorial authority by reaffirming the judiciary's role as an
equitable gatekeeper.
78
Prior to AM General Corporation, the judiciary was established
as the entity charged with checking the improper exercise of agency
authority in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York.7 9 In
Walz, a taxpayer challenged the New York City Tax Commission's
grant of a tax exemption to church property as a violation of the
establishment clause of the First Amendment. 80 In its opinion, the
Court examined the legislative purpose of the tax exemption and the
degree to which there was government "entanglement with
religion."81 Concluding that New York City's exemption did not run
afoul of the Constitution, the Court noted that the historical
consequences of religious tax exemptions did not justify Walz's fear
of a state established church. 82  Ultimately, the holding in Walz
76. Id. at 474-75. The court noted that the EPA "could have appealed from the
grant of the permit by the county health department to the county's Pollution
Appeals Board, and could if necessary have obtained review in state court of that
board's decision." Id. The court further noted that AM General Corporation was
acting on a facially valid permit issued by the state, greatly attenuating the
appropriateness of an exorbitant civil penalty. Id. at 475.
77. Id.; see also Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1015, (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting
that it is an "insult" to state courts to permit their decisions to be revised by federal
agencies).
78. See Alaska, 124 S. Ct. 1006. "EPA, we are confident, could not indulge in
the inequitable conduct ADEC and the dissent hypothesize while the federal courts
sit to review EPA's actions." Id. See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,
678-79 (1970). Walz is discussed infra in notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
79. Walz, 397 U.S. at 678.
80. Id. at 667. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . I..." d  at 667 n.2. The taxpayer in Walz
argued that providing a tax exemption to religious organizations indirectly required
him to contribute to those organizations when he paid his share of city taxes. Id. at
667.
81. Id. at 673-74.
82. Id. at 679. "Nothing in ... two centuries of uninterrupted freedom from
established the judiciary as the guardian of the constitutionally
mandated balance of power, implicitly investing in that body the role
of insuring state action remained within constitutional bounds.
83
The concern with the balance of power in administrative decision
making was addressed again more than twenty years later in Gregory
v. Ashcroft.84  As the scope of federal agency power increasingly
expanded to include supervisorial roles over equivalent state
agencies,85  the Court was forced to address the particular
circumstances in which Congress would be allowed to alter the
constitutionally mandated balance of power between state and federal
government.86  In Gregory, several state judges challenged a
mandatory retirement provision as a violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 87  Noting the existence of
Constitutional authority for Congress to "impose its will on the
States," the Court held that the exercise of such authority should not
be done "lightly." 88 Finding that the provisions of the ADEA were
taxation has given the remotest sign of leading to an established church or religion.
..." Id. The Court further noted that "[a]ny move that realistically 'establishes' a
church or tends to do so can be dealt with 'while this Court sits."' Id.
83. See id. at 678.
84. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
85. See Marlissa S. Briggett, Comment, State Supremacy in the Federal
Realm: The Interstate Compact, 18 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 751, 772 n.130
(1991) (noting that federal agencies will want a supervisory role when there is
federal participation in an interstate compact).
86. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460. Specifically, the Court addressed the
particular concerns surrounding a state's right to establish its own standards and
regulations for state officials and other public employees of the state. Id. at 462.
Noting that the Equal Protection Clause was a valid check on state authority, the
Court found that matters resting clearly within a state's discretion demanded much
lower scrutiny. Id.
87. Id. at 456. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits an
employer from discharging any person who is at least forty years old due to his or
her age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 63 1(a) (2004).
88. 501 U.S. 460. Citing the Supremacy Clause for the proposition that
Congress may "legislate in areas traditionally regulated by the States" as long at is
acting "within the powers granted it under the Constitution." Id. The Supremacy
Clause states: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws
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not applicable to the judges in Gregory,89 the Court noted that a mere
statutory ambiguity was not sufficient grounds for determining a
Congressional intent to "alter the usual constitutional balance
between the States and the Federal Government." 90
C. Deference to Agency Interpretations
Ambiguous statutory language, while not potent enough to alter
the balance of power between state and federal government, has
proven to be of central importance when considering the appropriate
degree of deference that should be provided to a particular agency
interpretation.9' The application of judicial deference is not foreign
to the EPA's interpretations of CAA provisions, 92 and it is often
intertwined with questions concerning the balance of power and
authority between the EPA and state environmental agencies.
93
The concept of judicial deference to an agency's interpretation of
statutory language originated in the case of Skidmore v. Swift &
Company.94 In Skidmore, employees of a packing plant brought an
action to recover overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act.95 The
employees specifically challenged an interpretation by the
administrator of the Act that hours spent sleeping and eating at work
of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
89. 501 U.S. at 473. "We will not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless
Congress has made it clear the judges are included." Id. at 467 (emphasis in
original).
90. Id. at 461 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985)). Any such intent must be made "unmistakably clear." Id. The Court
further noted that giving the "state-displacing weight of federal law to mere
congressional ambiguity" would violate the balance of power preserved in the
Constitution. Id. at 464 (quoting L Tribe., American Constitutional Law § 6-25,
480 (2d ed. 1988)).
91. If the statutory text is sufficiently ambiguous, Courts will give conclusive
weight to reasonable agency interpretations. See infra notes 106-110 and
accompanying text.
92. See discussion of Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, infra notes 106-
110 and accompanying text.
93. See Alaska, 124 S. Ct. 983; see also Train, 421 U.S. at 60.
94. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
95. Id. at 135. The Fair Labor Standards Act can be located at 29 U.S.C. § 201
(2004).
did not qualify as time subject to overtime provisions. 96  The
administrator of the Act rejected the interpretation of the employees,
and the Court deferred to that interpretation in rejecting their claim.97
The Skidmore Court justified its deference to the interpretation of the
Act's administrator by citing his specialized experience and expertise
in applying the Act.98  The Court was careful to note that the
interpretations of the administrator were "not controlling... by reason
of their authority," but instead should be consulted for varying
degrees of "guidance" based upon several factors, including the
interpretation's "power to persuade." 99
The cases following Skidmore provided increasingly complex
nuances for the application of judicial deference to administrative
interpretations and to judicial review of agency action in general. In
Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.,
the Court addressed the role of the reasonableness of an agency's
decision-making process in dictating the degree to which a given
decision should be afforded deference.'00  In Bowman, several
96. Id. at 137-39. The employees in Skidmore were charged with monitoring
and responding to fire alarms located throughout the Swift packing plant. Id. at
135. The requirements of the job forced the employees to remain continuously on-
call. Id. The employees were provided with a climate controlled fire hall that
contained sleeping quarters and some items for the employees' amusement. Id. at
136. The employees could use their free time as they saw fit, provided that they
"stay in or close by the fire hall and be ready to respond to alarms." Id. The
employees argued that the time spent in the fire hall constituted "hours worked"
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. The packing company disagreed, citing no
indication in the act or the publications from its administrator that such hours were
subject the overtime provisions of the act. Id.
97. Id. at 139-40.
98. Id. at 139. The "Administrator's policies are made in pursuance of official
duty, based upon more specialized experience and broader investigations and
information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case." Id. The Court
also noted that an administrator "has accumulated a considerable experience in the
problems of ascertaining working time in employments involving periods of
inactivity and a knowledge of the customs prevailing in reference to their solution."
Id. at 137-38.
99. Id. at 140. The weight accorded to an administrator's decision "will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade." Id.
100. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S.
281 (1975). The case also discusses the application of the "arbitrary and
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companies authorized by the Interstate Commerce Commission to
transport goods challenged the commission's issuance of additional
authorizations to their competitors.10' The challenging companies
sought to overturn the commission's decision by arguing that it
arbitrarily rejected evidence that additional carriers were not
needed.' 0 2 In affirming the issuance of the authorizations, the Court
noted that the Commission's decision had a "rational basis" sufficient
to satisfy the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.103 While
describing the Commission's decision-making process as being less
than "a paragon of clarity,"'' 4 the Court noted that agency decisions
will be upheld when "the agency's path may reasonably be
discerned., 10 5
Several years after Skidmore and Bowman, the Court expanded
the scope of judicial deference in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, elevating certain agency interpretations
to the status of controlling authority.10 6  In Chevron, an
environmental advocacy group challenged an EPA interpretation of
the term "stationary source" as found in the CAA. 0 7 The court of
capricious" standard for judicial review of agency action. Id. at 283. Under that
standard, courts must reject any agency action found to be "arbitrary, capricious" or
"an abuse of discretion." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2004).
101. Id. at 285. The companies challenging the Interstate Commerce
Commission's action made "presentations designed to show that their existing
service was satisfactory and that the [competitor] applicants would not offer
measurably superior performance." Id. The commission rejected their
presentation, and the companies challenged that decision in federal court as a
violation of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act in that it was arbitrary and
capricious. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 290. "But we can discern in the Commission's opinion a rational
basis for its treatment of the evidence, and the 'arbitrary and capricious' test does
not require more." Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 286.
106. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984). "When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provisicn,
fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy ... the
challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges-who have no constituency-
have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do." Id. Prior
to Chevron, agency interpretations were treated as persuasive but not controlling
authority by reviewing judges. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
107. Id. at 842. The EPA interpretation allowed an entity to adopt a plant
appeals rejected the agency's interpretation, adopting instead a "static
judicial definition" that lacked a basis in Congressional intent. 0 8
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court's finding,
establishing a strong standard of deference whereby agency
interpretations are controlling on reviewing courts. 109 Application of
the Chevron standard requires that the statutory language at issue be
"ambiguous" and that the agency's interpretation of the language be
"reasonable.""10
Following its creation of Chevron deference, the Court addressed
the question of when agency action is final in Bennett v. Spear. 1'
Determining the finality of agency action is significant in
administrative law, because it is generally a prerequisite to obtaining
judicial review. 112 In Bennett, the Fish and Wildlife Service issued a
biological opinion concluding that the continued operation of a
particular dam would jeopardize the existence of certain species of
fish native to the region." 3 The service suggested that maintaining
minimum water levels in the dam's reservoir would reduce the
danger to the fish." 14 Several entities that would be affected by a
change in the dam's operation brought suit in federal court to
wide definition of the term "stationary source" instead of classifying each of its
pollution emitting devices as individual stationary sources. Id. This interpretation
allowed regulated entities to increase pollution in one area of their facility so long
as there was an equivalent decrease in another area. Id. This interpretation became
known as the "bubble" theory. Id.
108. Id. at 842.
109. Id. at 842-43. "[A] court must give effect to an agency's regulation
containing a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute." Christensen v.
Harris County, 529 U.S: 576, 586-87 (2002).
110. 467 U.S. at 842-43. For a recent application of Chevron and Skidmore
deference principles, see Washington State Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs. v.
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 (2003).
111. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 159.
112. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2004) ("A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate
agency action or ruling not directly reviewable is subject to review on the review of
the final agency action.") Id.
113. Id. at 159. The operation of the Klamath Project Dam in southern Oregon
was thought to have a potential long term impact on the population of the Lost
River Sucker and the Shortnose Sucker, both of which were listed as endangered
species. Id.
114. Id.
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challenge the service's opinion as arbitrary and capricious.115 One of
the central issues addressed by the majority in deciding the case
involved the degree to which the biological opinion represented final
agency action. 16 Holding that the opinion constituted such action as
a result of its "direct and appreciable legal consequences," the Court
established a two part test for determining when agency action is
final.1 17
Several years later, the Court's decision in Christensen v. Harris
County began to narrow the broad scope of Chevron deference by
excluding interpretations lacking finality." t8  In Christensen,
employees of a county sheriff's department sued the county for an
alleged violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938." Prior to
adopting the policy challenged by its employees, the county wrote to
the Department of Labor and inquired about the proposed policy's
legality. 120  The Department of Labor responded with an opinion
letter establishing the circumstances under which the county's policy
115. Id.
116. Id. at 161. The three central issues in the case concerned the standing of
the affected entities to challenge the agency action, the degree to which judicial
review of the subject matter of the decision was precluded, and the degree to which
judicial review was precluded on the grounds that the agency's action was not final.
Id. The requirement that agency action be final is found in the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, which "provides a right to judicial review of all
'final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy."' Id. (quoting 5
U.S.C. § 704 (2004)).
117. Id. at 178. The first requirement for agency action to be considered final
is that it must "mark the 'consummation' of the agency's decisionmaking process."
Id. at 177-78, quoting Chicago v. S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 113 (1948). The second requirement for agency action to be considered
final is that it "must be one by which 'rights or obligations have been determined,'
or from which 'legal consequences will flow."' Id. at 178 (quoting Port of Boston
Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 62, 71
(1970)).
118. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2002).
119. Id. at 578. The employees challenged a county policy which required
them to schedule time off in order to reduce the amount of their accrued
compensatory time. Id. The policy was adopted by the county after concerns that
it lacked the fiscal resources to compensate employees for unused compensatory
hours. Id.
120. Id. at 580. The county asked the Department of Labor "whether the
Sheriff may schedule non-exempt employees to use or take compensatory time."
Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner 18-19).
would be permitted. 12 1  In challenging the policy, the county
employees argued that Chevron deference applied to the Department
of Labor's opinion letter.' 22  Holding opinion letters to be in a
category of interpretations which do not qualify for Chevron
deference, the Court refused to grant them controlling authority. 123
Applying instead the test for Skidmore deference, the Court
concluded that the Department of Labor's opinion letter was not
persuasive and upheld the county's policy. 1
24
In the same year that the Court decided Christensen, its decision
in Barnhart v. Walton directly contradicted Chevron's requirement of
finality by applying such deference to agency regulations which were
not the product of formal rulemaking procedures.' 21 In Barnhart, an
individual named Cleveland Walton applied for disability and
supplemental security income benefits.' 26  The Social Security
Administration denied his application, interpreting one of its
regulations to require that an individual be unable to engage in
"substantial gainful activity" for at least twelve months prior to
receiving benefits. 127 Mr. Walton challenged that finding, arguing
121. Id. at 581. The opinion letter provided that the county could order
employees to use compensatory time if a prior agreement with the employees
"specifically provided such a provision." Id.
122. Id. at 586.
123. Id. The Court noted that interpretations which "lack the force of law,"
including "policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines," do not
qualify for Chevron deference. Id. Instead, non-binding interpretations are entitled
to Skidmore deference to the extent which they have the 'power to persuade."' Id.
(quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
124. Id. "[W]e find unpersuasive the agency's interpretation of the statute at
issue in this case." Id.
125. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221 (2002). Formal rulemaking
procedures include an opportunity for public comment and several other procedures
that ensure an agency gives substantial consideration to its newly proposed rules.
Matthew Bender, 3-13 Administrative Law § 13.02, 2004. "Formal rulemaking
requires an agency to comply with the full hearing procedures described in Sections
556 and 557 of the APA, whenever a statutory provision other than the APA
mandates agency creation of a 'record after opportunity for an agency hearing."'
Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2004)). Regulations produced outside of formal
rulemaking are generally only binding on the agency. See 535 U.S. at 212.
126. Id. at 215. Mr. Walton had developed several mental problems which
caused him to lose his job as a full-time teacher. Id.
127. Id. at 216. Mr. Walton had only been unable to engage in substantial
gainful activity for eleven months. Id.
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that the text of the regulation made the twelve month requirement
applicable only to the length of the individual's impairment. 128 In
upholding the agency's interpretation, the Court noted that
"particular deference" was appropriate for agency interpretations of
longstanding duration. 129  Responding to Mr. Walton's contention
that the regulations at issue in this case were informal and only
recently adopted, the Court noted that an agency's interpretation will
not automatically be deprived of deference when it is reached
through means which are not traditionally part of the formal
rulemaking process. 130
The Court's decision in Barnhart was by no means the first time
it expanded the applicability of Chevron deference.' 3' Prior to that
decision, the Court's opinion in Bragdon v. Abbott addressed the
availability of Chevron deference to interpretations of statutes
delegating authority to multiple agencies. 132 In Bragdon, an HIV-
infected woman was denied dental services in the office of her
treating clinician. 133 She filed suit in federal court, alleging that her
dentist violated the American's With Disabilities Act. 134  In
determining whether HIV constituted one of the disabilities covered
by the Act, the Court consulted the interpretations of the various
agencies charged with enforcing the Act's provisions.' 35 The Court
justified its approach by noting that Chevron deference would not be
precluded even though the Act delegated authority to several
agencies,136 and ultimately found HIV to be included within the Act's
128. Id.
129. Id. at 220. Walton attempted to preempt the Court's use of this reasoning
in granting deference by arguing that the regulations were recently adopted and
were likely the result of this very lawsuit. Id.
130. Id. at 221. Noting the direct contradiction of Christensen suggested by its
opinion, the Court commented: "If this Court's opinion in Christensen v. Harris
County suggested an absolute rule to the contrary, our later opinion in United States
v. Mead denied the suggestion." Id. (internal citations omitted).
131. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001).
132. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
133. Id. at 628-29.
134. Id. at 629.
135. Id. at 642. "Our holding is confirmed by a consistent course of agency
interpretation before and after enactment of the ADA. Every agency to consider
the issue ... found statutory coverage for persons with asymptomatic HIV." Id.
136. Id. Referencing its holding in Skidmore, the Court noted that "[it] is
definition of disability.' 
37
III. FACTS
In 1996, Cominco began a project to expand zinc concentrate
production at one of its mines in rural Alaska.1 38 The mine, which
was the region's largest employer, opened in 1988 and was classified
as a major emitting facility under the CAA. 139 Located in a region
classified as an attainment area under the CAA, 140 the mine
enough to observe that the well-reasoned views of the agencies implementing a
statute" may properly be consulted for guidance. Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)).
137. Id. at 655.
138. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 994. The expansion was to take place at Cominco's
Red Dog mine. Id. Cominco anticipated that the expansion would increase
production by forty percent. Id. The expansion was also anticipated to increase
nitrous oxide emissions from the plant's power generators by more than forty tons
each year. Id.
139. Id. Changes to major emitting facilities that result in a nitrogen oxide
emission increase of more than forty tons per year require a permit under the
Prevention of Significant Deterioration program. Id. at 472. Changes include "any
physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source
which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or which
results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously emitted." 42 U.S.C. §
741 l(a)(4) (2004). A major emitting facility is defined as a "stationary sourc[e] of
air pollutants which emit[s], or [has] the potential to emit, one hundred tons per
year or more of any pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2004). A stationary source is
"any building, structure, facility or installation which emits or may emit any air
pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(3) (2004).
140. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 992. The region had attained the national standards
for concentrations of nitrous oxide in the ambient air. Id. The CAA provides for
three categories of classification: nonattainment, attainment, and unclassifiable. 42
U.S.C. § 7407 (d)(l)(A)(i)-(iii) (2004). A nonattainment area is a "geographic area
in which the level of a ... pollutant is higher than the level allowed by the federal
standards." The Plain English Guide to the Clean Air Act (2004), at
http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/peg-caa/pegcaalO.html (italics omitted) [hereinafter
Plain English Guide]. An attainment area i's a "geographic area in which levels of
a[n].. .air pollutant meet the health-based primary standard for the pollutant." Id.
A primary standard is "a pollution limit based on health effects," and a secondary
standard is a "pollution limit based on environmental effects such as damage to
property, plants, visibility, etc." Id. (italics omitted). The CAA defines an
unclassifiable area as one that "cannot be classified on the basis of available
information as meeting or not meeting the national primary or secondary ambient
air quality standard for the pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)(A)(iii) (2004).
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employed the use of six diesel electric generators to provide power
for its operations. 141  As part of its plan to expand its capacity for
zinc production, Cominco applied to the ADEC for a permit
authorizing increased electricity generation by the mine's standby
generator.142 Since the mine was located in a region that had attained
NAAQS, 143 any expansion or modification of its facilities required
review to ensure that increases in nitrous oxide emissions would not
significantly deteriorate air quality in the region.144
Subject to the provisions of the CAA, a state permitting authority
is required to select the best available control technology (BACT) to
minimize the amount of pollutants emitted by a new or modified
source.145  Since Cominco's standby generator was a source of
141. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 994.
142. Id. Alaska's State Implementation Plan (SIP) had been approved by the
EPA, pursuant to the requirements of the CAA. Id. at 991. Accordingly, Alaska
was vested with the primary responsibility to issue permits and insure that the
national air quality standards were being met. Id. at 992. The language of the
CAA vests States with the "primary responsibility for assuring air quality within
the entire geographic area comprising such State." 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (2004).
One of the key aspects of that responsibility involves the submission of an
"implementation plan ... which will specify the manner in which national primary
and secondary ambient air quality standards will be achieved and maintained." Id.
A state's SIP is a "detailed description of the programs a state will use to carry out
its responsibilities under the Clean Air Act." Plain English Guide, supra note 140,
(italics omitted).
143. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 992. Ambient air quality standards refer to the
maximum level of pollutants allowed in outdoor air. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)
(2004). The national standards are divided into primary and secondary standards.
Id. A primary standard limits pollutants which pose a threat to public health. Id.
Secondary standards impose limits on pollutants which damage buildings and
destroy the environment. See Air Quality Planning and Standards, at
http://www.epa.gpv/air/oaqps/cleanair.html.
144. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 992. Specifically, the modifications were subject to
the CAA's Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality (PSD) program.
Id. The program was "designed to ensure that air quality in attainment areas or
areas that are already 'clean' will not degrade." Id. (quoting Roy S. Belden, CLEAN
AiR ACT 43 (2001)).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4) (2004). The CAA defines BACT as "an emission
limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant... emitted
from or which results from any major emitting facility, which the permitting
authority ... determines is achievable for such facility. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3)
(2004). An agency's BACT determination must take "into account energy,
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs." Id. Depending on the
nitrogen oxide emissions, 146 expanding its generating capacity would
make it subject to the CAA's BACT requirement. 147 In reviewing
Cominco's permit application, ADEC employed the EPA's
recommended top-down methodology to determine the appropriate
BACT technology for the standby generator. 48  ADEC found
selective catalytic reduction (SCR) to be the best available
technology for controlling nitrogen oxide emissions and issued a
draft permit which required Cominco to equip its standby generator
with SCR. 149  Cominco responded to the initial draft proposal by
questioning the economic feasibility of SCR technology and
suggesting instead that it equip the standby generator with a less
effective and less expensive control technology.' 
50
location of the emitting facility, some BACT determinations must be approved in
advance by the EPA. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 993.
146. Id. at 994.
147. Id. "Modifications to major emitting facilities that increase nitrogen
oxide emissions in excess of 40 tons per year require a PSD permit." Id. at 472.
"[N]o PSD permit may issue unless 'the proposed facility is subject to"' a BACT
determination for each pollutant that the facility emits. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
7475(a)(4) (2004)).
148. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 994. To make a BACT determination using the top-
down methodology, an agency ranks all available pollution control technologies in
order of effectiveness. Id. The most stringent technology (i.e., the first technology
listed) is selected as BACT unless the entity applying for the permit can show that
"technical considerations, or energy, environmental, or economic impacts justify a
conclusion that the most stringent technology is not 'achievable' in that case." Id.
at 995. (quoting EPA, New Source Review Workshop Manual B2 (Draft Oct.
1990)). If the applicant can demonstrate that the most stringent option is not
achievable, then the next most stringent option will be selected as BACT unless the
applicant can show that standard is also not achievable. Id. The process continues
down the list until the agency selects the first "achievable" BACT device. Id.
Application of the top-down methodology is recommended by the EPA, but states
are not required to use it. Id. at n.7.
149. Id. at 994. SCR is a pollution control technology that employs metals
such as titanium and platinum combined with ammonia or urea to reduce nitrogen
oxide emissions from the exhaust of diesel combustion engines. Id. at n.5. While
somewhat expensive, the technology reduces nitrogen oxide emissions by ninety
percent. Id. at 994-95.
150. Id. Cominco proposed fitting all of its generators with Low NOx
technology, a process in which the combustion space of a generator is modified to
enhance the mixing of air and diesel fuel. Id. at 994 n.6. While substantially less
expensive than SCR, Low NOx technology reduces nitrogen oxide emissions by
only thirty percent. Id.
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ADEC rejected Cominco's alternative proposal, finding the
estimated cost of using SCR on the standby generator to be well
within the range that EPA would consider economically feasible.' 51
Cominco responded by proposing to fit all six of its generators with
the less expensive technology, achieving a net pollution reduction
comparable to that which would be obtained by fitting the standby
generator with SCR. 152  ADEC accepted Cominco's alternative
proposal, 53 but was immediately confronted by warnings from the
National Park Service and the EPA that Cominco's emissions off-
setting alternative was not a valid justification for not requiring the
use of SCR on the standby generator. 154  In response to these
comments, ADEC issued a revised permit which excluded the
emissions off-setting justification but retained the less expensive
control technology as BACT.155
EPA protested the revised permit, citing the absence of evidence
to support ADEC's economic justification for not selecting SCR as
BACT. 156  EPA suggested that ADEC could justify the permit by
including substantive evidence of the adverse economic effect that
SCR would have on Cominco. 157 Citing confidentiality, Cominco
151. Id. at 995. Cominco initially characterized the cost of using SCR
technology as close to $5,643 per ton. Id. Using Cominco's own data, ADEC
determined the cost of using SCR technology to be "between $1,586 and $2,279
per ton." Id.
152. Id. Net emissions would be lowered by an estimated 396 tons per year if
Cominco installed Low NOx technology on all of its generators. Id. Even with
Low NOx installed, however, emissions would increase by seventy-nine tons per
year if the expansion of the Red Dog mine required that all six generators go into
operation. Id.
153. Id. ADEC approved Cominco's alternative by noting that it was
"logistically and economically less onerous to Cominco." Id.
154. Id. The National Park Service commented that Cominco's alternative
solution would fail to achieve the same emissions reduction achievable by
installation of SCR on all of its generators. Id. at 995-96. The EPA agreed with
the National Park Service, noting that new emissions could not be offset by
"imposing new controls on other" emissions sources which were "not subject to
BACT." Id. at 996. The EPA further commented that the CAA does not allow a
permitting authority to choose a less stringent limit than the technology that it
determines to be BACT. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 997.
refused to provide any such evidence.' 58  In December of 1999,
ADEC approved Cominco's permit application without including the
economic analysis which the EPA suggested. 159 That same day, EPA
ordered ADEC not to issue Cominco's permit until it "satisfactorily
documents why SCR is not BACT for... [Cominco's] generator."'' 60
Two months later, the EPA ordered Cominco to stop construction or
modification activities at the Red Dog Mine.' 6 1 On July 6, 2003,
ADEC issued Cominco a permit authorizing modification of its
standby generator and requiring the less expensive control
technology. 162
In response to the EPA's order requiring Cominco to stop
construction or modification activities, ADEC and Cominco
petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for judicial review.163
The Ninth Circuit found that the EPA had authority to issue the order
and "had properly exercised its discretion in doing so."' 64 ADEC and
Cominco appealed the Ninth Circuit's findings, alleging that EPA's
actions were arbitrary and capricious since the CAA could not be
interpreted to give EPA the authority to scrutinize the reasonableness
of a state agency's BACT determination. 65  The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, affirming the Ninth Circuit's
holding and noting that such "checking" authority is authorized by
the provisions of the CAA. 16
6






163. Id. at 998. See Alaska v. EPA, 244 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002). The CAA
provides that parties may petition the applicable Court of Appeals to review EPA
action relating to the regulations in a state's SIP, provided that the action is
considered final. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2004). For a discussion of when agency
action is final, see supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
164. Id. at 998.
165. Id. at 999.
166. Id. at 991. Holding that EPA may "act to block construction of a new
major pollutant emitting facility" when it finds a state agency's BACT
determination to be unreasonable. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. Scope of EPA Authority
Justice Ginsburg's opinion begins with a detailed recitation of the
facts leading up to ADEC's filing of a petition for review with the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.' 67  Framing the entire case as one
centering on the scope of the EPA's power to enforce the CAA's
PSD program, Justice Ginsburg discusses the disputed EPA
interpretations of several CAA provisions.' 68 Noting that the State of
Alaska is the permitting authority in this instance, Justice Ginsburg
defines the relevant legal issue as that of whether the EPA may
invalidate a state issued permit when it believes that the state
agency's BACT determination is unreasonable.
1 69
In analyzing the proper mechanism for EPA enforcement of CAA
provisions, the majority begins by citing the intent of Congress in
passing the PSD requirements. 170  As part of the CAA, the PSD
requirements reflected the product of a larger Congressional concern
with the protection of public health and safety. 71 The problem of air
pollution in the United States was one that Congress believed to
merit special attention such that the need arose to invest power in an
167. Id. at 983-88. See supra notes 138-166 and accompanying text.
168. Id. at 990. Relevant to this case, the CAA confers supervisory authority
on the EPA in two specific instances. See id. The CAA provides the EPA with the
authority to issue an "order prohibiting construction, to prescribe an administrative
remedy, or to commence a civil action for injunctive relief' when it finds that "a
State is not complying with a CAA requirement governing construction of a
pollutant source .. " Id. at 990-91 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (2004)). The EPA
is also authorized to "'take such measures, including issuance of an order, or
seeking injunctive relief, as necessary to prevent the construction' of a major
pollutant emitting facility" which fails to meet the PSD requirements. Id. at 991
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (2004)).
169. Id. at 990 (discussing whether the EPA may act to block construction of a
new major pollutant emitting facility permitted by ADEC when EPA finds ADEC's
BACT determination unreasonable in light of the guides § 747(3) prescribes).
170. Id. at 992 (discussing the purpose of the PSD program).
171. Id. The CAA lists the first objective of the PSD program as "protect[ing]
public health and welfare from any actual or potential adverse effect which in the
[EPA's] judgment may reasonably be anticipated to occur from air pollution or
from exposures to pollutants in other media .. " 42 U.S.C. § 7470(1) (2004).
executive agency to achieve the CAA's ultimate goals. 172 Finding
the EPA to be the appropriate agency to be charged with CAA
enforcement, Congress provided it with a significant collection of
supervisory tools. Two of the arrows placed in the EPA's quiver for
the enforcement of PSD requirements provide the agency with the
authority to issue an order or seek injunctive relief to "prevent the
construction or modification of a major emitting facility which does
not conform" to those requirements. 173  After reciting the facts
surrounding ADEC's issuance of a permit to Cominco, and the
subsequent EPA response, the majority turns to the locus of its
authority to review the action taken by the EPA.1
74
B. Finality of EPA Action
Prior to commencing its analysis of the substantive legal issues
presented in the case, the majority addresses the question of whether
it has subject matter jurisdiction to review the EPA's action. 175
ADEC filed its motion for review under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1),
alleging that the issuance of a stop order by the EPA constituted final
agency action. 176  The EPA initially contested the legitimacy of
judicial review, arguing that its orders were "interlocutory" and
172. See Paul G. Rogers, The Clean Air Act of 1970, EPA JOURNAL, Jan.-Feb.
1990, available at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/caa70/l 1.htm (last visited
December 21, 2004).
One of the reasons the 1967 Air Quality Act failed and thus
spurred Congress to enact a tough national air quality program in
1970 was the almost complete lack of enforcement of the earlier
statute .... It will be critical to keep the pressure on in order to
see to it that those who are covered by the statute obey it - or pay
the requisite penalties for violations.
Id.
173. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 993-94.
174. Id. at 998. The majority discusses the process by which Cominco applied
and subsequently obtained a permit to add an additional generator with Low NOx
technology. Id. at 994-98.
175. Id. at 998-99.
176. Id. at 998. Judicial review of agency action is generally limited to those
situations where the agency has acted with finality. See supra note 178 and
accompanying text. The provisions in the CAA which provide for judicial review
requires that agency action be "final" before being subject to review in an
applicable court of appeals. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2004).
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"unreviewable" until it chose to take action to enforce them. 177 The
majority rejects that argument and agrees with the reasoning supplied
by the court of appeals, holding that the EPA's stop orders had the
"requisite degree of finality."' 178
In finding the action taken by the EPA to be final, thus
reviewable under 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1), Justice Ginsburg begins by
noting that the court of appeals correctly applied the standards
established by the Court in prior case law. 179 To be considered final,
agency action must signify the end of its "decisionmaking process"
and determine the "rights or obligations" of a party while creating
"legal consequences" for a party's failure to fulfill those
obligations. 180 Justice Ginsburg notes that the EPA stated its "final
position" on the circumstances surrounding ADEC's issuance of its
permit, satisfying the requirement that the agency's action mark the
close of its decisionmaking process.'8 1 She continues by noting that
Cominco would risk suffering "practical and legal consequences" if it
chose to begin construction pursuant to ADEC's permit.182 Agreeing
with the holding of the court of appeals, Justice Ginsburg concludes
that the EPA's issuance of a stop order to Cominco was sufficiently
final to merit judicial review.183 Prior to turning to more substantive
legal issues, Justice Ginsburg briefly notes that no relevant due
process concerns have been raised by ADEC or Cominco. 18 4 After
briefly rejecting ADEC's contention that the record was
177. Id. at 998. The lower court dismissed EPA's contention, finding the "new
legal obligations" imposed by the stop orders to have the requisite degree of
finality. Id. at n.10 (244 F.3d at 750-751).
178. Id. at 998.
179. Id. The court of appeals noted that it was "undisputed.. .that EPA had
spoken its 'last word' on whether ADEC had adequately justified its conclusion
that Low NOx was" BACT for the proposed generator. Id. The court of appeals
further noted that defying EPA's order would cause Cominco to "risk civil and
criminal penalties." Id. Based on those facts, the Court noted that the principles
established in Bennet v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, were correctly applied. Id. For a
discussion of Bennet, see supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
180. Bennet, 520 U.S. at 177-78.
181. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 999 (citing Alaska, 244 F.3d at 750).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. "No question has been raised here ... about the adequacy of EPA's
preorder procedures .... " Id.
incomplete,' 85 Justice Ginsburg turns her attention toward one of the
key issues of the case: the proper interpretation of sections 113(a)(5)
and 167 of the CAA.
C. Interpretation of CAA Provisions
Prior to beginning its analysis of the EPA's interpretation of
sections 113(a)(5) and 167, the majority again frames the central
issue of the case as whether the relevant sections of the CAA grant
the EPA the ability to "ensur[e] that a state permitting authority's
BACT determination is reasonable in light of the statutory guides."'
186
The Court notes that the sections lodge general "supervisory
responsibility" in the EPA with regard to the construction or
modification of a polluting facility subject to the provisions of the
PSD program.' 87  Specifically, the supervisory role granted in the
statute "arm[s]" the EPA with the authority to order construction
halted when a State fails to comply with CAA requirements or
prohibitions and when the construction of a particular facility fails to
satisfy applicable PSD requirements. 188  With respect to the PSD
program, the majority notes that one express "preconstruction
185. Id. While the case was before the Ninth Circuit, ADEC complained that
the record was incomplete and not sufficient for appellate review. Id. Responding
to that concern, the Ninth Circuit provided EPA the opportunity "to supplement the
record." Id. Based on the additional materials added to the record by EPA, all
parties agreed that the record was "adequate to resolve [ADEC's review petition]."
Id. (quoting 298 F.3d at 818).
186. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 999.
187. Id.
188. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5) (2003) (held unconstitutional by Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236 (11 th Cir. 2003)).
Whenever, on the basis of any available information, the
Administrator finds that State is not acting in compliance with
any requirement or prohibition of the Act relating to the
construction of new sources or the modification of existing
sources, the Administrator may-issue an order prohibiting the
construction or modification... ; issue an administrative penalty
order... ; or bring a civil action ....
Id; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7477 (2004). "The Administrator shall . . . take such
measures, including issuance of an order, or seeking injunctive relief, as necessary
to prevent the construction or modification of a major emitting facility which does
not conform to the requirements of this part ..... Id. For the basic provisions of
the PSD program, see supra notes 144 and 147.
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requirement is inclusion of a BACT determination in a facility's PSD
permit."' 89 While the "permitting authority" exercises "primary or
initial responsibility for identifying BACT," the Court notes that the
EPA has the primary responsibility to insure that a BACT limitation
is included in a given PSD permit.1 90 It further notes as undisputed
the EPA's authority to issue a stop order when a facility is being
constructed pursuant to a PSD permit which lacks a BACT
designation entirely. 191 It is at this point where the disagreement
between ADEC and EPA arises.
1. EPA Interpretation - Majority Approach
Justice Ginsburg next addresses the specific interpretation that the
EPA arrives at in determining the scope of its authority to enforce
CAA provisions.192 The EPA interprets the relevant provisions of the
CAA as granting it the authority not merely to determine that PSD
permits contain any BACT designation, but that such permits contain
"reasonable" BACT designations. 93  The agency arrives at this
interpretation by reading the statutory definition of BACT together
with the CAA's "explicit listing of BACT as a '[p]reconstruction
[r]equirement. '194 The EPA argues that there is implicit in the
statutory language a grant of authority to insure that state BACT
determinations are "reasonably moored to" CAA provisions.1 95
Finding the EPA's statutory construction to be "rationally
construed," the majority notes that it warrants the "respect and
approbation" of the Court. 196
189. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 999. The Court again notes that BACT is defined as
"an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of [a] pollutant
...which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is
achievable for [a] facility." Id. at 485 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2004))
(alterations in original).
190. Id. at 999.
191. Id. at 999-1000.
192. Id. at 1000.
193. Id.
194. Id. (formatting in original).
195. Id.
196. Id. The degree of deference afforded agency interpretations is discussed
supra at notes 90-137 and accompanying text.
Justice Ginsburg next focuses on two key terms which the
majority cites as the rationale for the basis of the interpretation
proffered by the EPA. 197 Focusing first on the statutory definition of
BACT, Justice Ginsburg notes that it "requires selection of an
emission control technology" that will result in the "maximum"
reduction of pollution "achievable."' 98 The majority then turns to a
discussion of the particular interpretation proffered by the EPA. In
interpreting the CAA to provide the authority to review state BACT
determinations for reasonableness, the EPA argues that there is
embodied with the terms "maximum" and "achievable" an implicit
requirement that BACT determinations be reasonable. The next
logical question, that of what agency or authority should properly
determine the reasonableness of those determinations, is answered by
the EPA by way of reference to the policy goals that Congress
intended to achieve with the enactment of the PSD program. 99 Not
surprisingly, the EPA cites itself as the agency Congress properly
intended to fulfill that role.200
The majority ultimately finds EPA's interpretation of the CAA to
197. Id. at 1000. The majority cites the terms "maximum" and "achievable" as
terms reasonably interpreted to provide discretion to EPA such that EPA can
determine the substantive reasonableness of a permitting authority's BACT
determination. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2004)).
198. Id. at 1002. The majority also notes the requirement that such a
determination be made after balancing the "energy, environmental, and economic
impacts, and other costs." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2004)). Such
balancing arguably requires a degree of discretion be exercised by the authority
performing the balancing, and it is at least theoretically possible that the agency
engaged in the balancing will make a balance determination that is not reasonable.
Id. Even so, the Court is bound to operate on the presumption that State agencies
act in good faith when making discretionary determinations of this type. See Alden
v. Maine, discussed supra at notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
199. Id. at 1000. "EPA stresses Congress' reason for enacting the PSD
program - to prevent significant deterioration of air quality in clean air states
within a State and neighboring States." Id. EPA further argues that goal will not
be realized in the absence of an administrative agency that can supervise the
reasonableness of state BACT determinations. Id. EPA cites the Congressional
Record to note the very real prospect that, absent national standards, States would
find themselves competing for industry by constantly providing for lower and more
economically feasible PSD permit requirements. Id. EPA further argues that its
surveillance role is necessary to prevent states from succumbing to
"interjurisdictional pressures to which Congress was alert." Id.
200. Id.
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be persuasive.201 In so doing, Justice Ginsburg first cites the fact that
the statutory interpretation proffered by the EPA is "reflected in
interpretive guides" which were published several times by the
EPA.2 °2 The relevance of this point is not to be missed, as the Justice
subsequently notes that "particular deference" is normally accorded
"to an agency interpretation of longstanding duration." 203 Particular
deference alone, however, is not the standard which the Court applies
to the EPA's interpretation. 204 Citing stronger degrees of deference
accorded to the EPA in past decisions, the Court proceeds to analyze
whether the EPA's particular interpretation of the CAA merits
Chevron deference.20 5  The majority ultimately finds the EPA
interpretation not to merit the strong deference afforded by Chevron,
but it notes that some level of respect must be accorded to "cogent"
interpretations by agencies which are made outside the parameters of
formal rulemaking.20 6  The majority opinion ultimately concludes
that EPA interpretation of the CAA provisions will be accorded that
C4measure of respect," though it never clearly states what the practical
consequences of such deference include.
20 7
201. 124 S. Ct. at 1001.
202. Id. The Court references the guides cited in the Brief for Respondents.
See id. at 983 (citing Brief for Respondents at 29-30). Those guides include a 1983
EPA PSD guidance memorandum and a 1993 guidance memorandum. Id. The
Court also cites to an EPA publication discussing the procedure for approving PSD
permits under Virginia's SIP. See Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality
Implementation Plans; Commonwealth of Virginia--Prevention of Significant
Deterioration Program, 63 Fed. Reg. 13795, 13797 (Mar. 23, 1998).
203. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1001 (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220
(2002)).
204. Id. The majority appears to believe it appropriate to apply Skidmore
deference to the EPA interpretation at issue in this case, noting that the "well-
reasoned views of an expert administrator rest on a body of experience and
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."
Id., citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642, quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at
139-40. For a discussion of Skidmore deference, see supra notes 93-98 and
accompanying text.
205. Id. at 1001. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Chevron deference.
206. Id. at 1001 (citing Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 371). The distinction between
formal and information rulemaking is discussed supra at note 125.
207. Id. at 1001. The dissenting opinion accuses the majority of "applying
Chevron de facto" noting that the majority opinion is "chock full of Chevron-type
language" and that the weakness of its statutory arguments forces it to "hide behind
2. EPA Interpretation - Minority Approach
It is precisely that ambiguity which appears to inflame the
dissenting opinion proffered by Justice Kennedy.2 ° s He begins his
dissent with a recitation of what he believes to be the plain meaning
of the relevant CAA provisions. 20 9 Such meaning, the Justice notes,
requires emphasis not on the words "maximum" and "achievable"
but on the word "requirement. ' 210 Finding the term not to be defined
in the statute, Justice Kennedy notes that "other provisions of the act"
must be consulted to arrive at a proper meaning.2 I t Citing the
language of section 7475(a), Justice Kennedy notes that
''requirement" is defined in this case as a reference to the
"preconstruction requirement" that a "major emitting facility" be
subject to a BACT determination.212 Based on that meaning, Justice
Kennedy attacks the majority's holding that the EPA is invested with
"broad oversight" to "ensure that a State's BACT determination is
reasonably moored to the Act's provisions. 213 Finding instead that
the act invests in the state permitting authority the sole discretion to
determine "what constitutes BACT,' ,214 Justice Kennedy charges the
Chevron's vocabulary." Id. at 1018 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
208. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "In applying Chevron de facto under these
circumstances . . . the majority undermines the well-established distinction our
precedents have drawn between Chevron and less deferential forms of review." Id.
209. Id. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Citing the dictionary definition of
"determine," the dissent finds the language of the CAA to vest the determination of
BACT in the state permitting authority alone. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) It
further accuses the majority or reading the words "maximum" and "achievable" out
of context, violating the "cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole." Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting King v. St. Vincent Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221
(1991)).
210. Id.
211. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
213. Id. (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
214. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy notes that "the statute does
not direct the State to find as BACT the technology that results in the maximum
reduction of a pollutant achievable for a facility in the abstract." Id. (internal
citations omitted). The statute requires state agencies to consider a "set of
contextual" factors including 'energy, environmental, and economic impacts and
other costs."' Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2004)).
The Justice further notes that "[ilt is clear that the CAA commits BACT
determinations to the discretion of the relevant permitting authorities." Id.
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majority with violating the "cardinal rule" of statutory interpretation
by reading the terms "maximum" and "achievable" out of context.21
5
Finding the only "requirement" of §§113(a)(5) and 167 to be the
inclusion of some BACT determination, the Dissent posits that EPA
has no enforcement authority beyond ensuring that such a
determination is included in the body of the applicable permit.216
Substantive review of the steps taken by the State agency to arrive at
its BACT determination is not within the scope of authority granted
to the EPA and cannot be read from provisions cited by EPA or the
majority.217 The only appropriate method for challenging the BACT
determinations of State agencies is recourse to the judicial review
procedures available within the given state. 218
Returning to the larger principles surrounding the proper
construction of the statutory text, Justice Kennedy notes that
Congress has demonstrated the ability to grant supervisory authority
to administrative agencies, including the EPA, in unambiguous
terms.2 19  Since it is not unreasonable to expect Congress to be
capable of exercising that ability in this instance, the presence of an
ambiguity, as perceived by the majority and EPA, does not point to a
Congressional intent to empower the EPA to determine the
reasonableness of state BACT determinations. 22 0 In fact, it leads the
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Here Justice Kennedy cites the
cardinal rule that a statute is to "be read as a whole." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(quoting 503 U.S. at 221 (1991)). The majority responds to this charge by noting
that it is also a "cardinal" principal that a statute ought to be "so construed that, if it
can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void or
insignificant." Id. at 1002 n.13 (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31
(2001)). The majority further notes that the dissent's view does not make state
agency BACT determinations conclusive, because they are still subject to judicial
review. Id.
216. Id. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
217. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Noting that the relevant statutory sections
"can supply no separate basis for EPA to exercise a supervisory role over a State's
discretionary decision." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
218. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "Unless an objecting party, including EPA,
prevails on judicial review, the determinations are conclusive." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
219. Id. at 1012 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
220. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy notes that Congress has
previously established federal oversight roles in "unambiguous language." Id.
dissent to conclude that Congress never intended to place such
authority in the EPA's hands.22'
Justice Kennedy next turns to the policy rationale that the EPA
cites to justify the need for upholding its interpretation of the
CAA.222 Ignoring the potential merits of EPA's argument that there
will be a "race to the bottom" in environmental standards absent EPA
oversight of BACT determinations, the dissent notes that the EPA's
concern directly conflicts with CAA's "clear mandate that States bear
the primary role in controlling pollution. 223  It further finds the
presumption by EPA and the majority that "state agencies are not to
be trusted" to be "unwarranted. 224  After concluding that the
majority and the EPA incorrectly interpreted the provisions of the
PSD portion of the CAA,225 Justice Kennedy notes the particular
manner in which ADEC properly fulfilled what the Dissent views as
its requisite CAA obligations. 226
The dissent takes issue not only with the validity of EPA and the
majority's statutory interpretation, but also with the degree of
deference afforded by the majority to EPA's interpretation of the
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Citing language in the Medicaid Act for its specific
inclusion of the terms "reasonable" and "adequate" in defining the standard for
Department of Health and Human Services' review of state Medicaid disbursement
programs, Justice Kennedy notes that Congress included "no analogous language"
when empowering the EPA to enforce the CAA. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(referencing Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990)).
221. Id. at 1012 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
222. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
223. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing HR Rep No. 90-254 choosing not to
dictate a federal response to balancing sometimes conflicting goals at the expense
of maximum flexibility and state discretion).
224. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). It was unwarranted because EPA itself said
so. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Also, it runs contrary to the presumption
established in Alden v. Maine that states act in good faith. 527 U.S. at 755.
225. Id. at 1012 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "As a result, EPA has no statutory
basis to invoke the enforcement authority of §§ 113(a)(5) and 167." Id. (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent notes that ADEC
"recognized it was required to make a BACT determination" and responded by
"provid[ing] a detailed accounting of the process" by which it "weigh[ed] the list of
statutory factors, stud[ied] all other relevant considerations, and decide[ed] the
technology that [could] best reduce pollution within practical constraints . I..." d.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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statutory text.227  While the majority opinion notes that Chevron
deference, the strongest form of deference available, is not available
to the EPA in this instance, 228 it ultimately gives "EPA the very...
deference . . . it says should be denied., 229 Justice Kennedy notes
that the majority was correct in determining that Chevron deference
was not applicable to this case, pointing out one additional reason
why such deference should not be applied: "[t]he statute is not in any
way ambiguous." 230 Noting that the majority's "actions . . . speak
louder than words," the dissent alleges that its opinion is "chock full
of Chevron-like language" and ultimately gives Chevron deference
"de facto."23 1 The dissent finds much gravity in this result, arguing
that it diminishes the clarity of the line between the proper
application of Chevron deference and the application of "less
deferential forms of judicial review."232 Absent a clear delineation of
when strong deference should and should not be applied, the dissent
fears that other administrative agencies will employ similar authority
and "relegat[e] States to the role of mere provinces or political
corporations, instead of coequal sovereigns entitled to the same
dignity and respect., 233 Such consequences could ultimately result in
the eradication of a functional system of cooperative federalism, a
risk the dissent is not willing to take.234 For that reason, the dissent
finds the statutory interpretation proffered by ADEC to be persuasive
and appropriate for determining the scope of EPA authority.235
227. Id. at 1018 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy also notes that the EPA's
"interpretation in this case, presented in internal guidance memoranda.., does not
qualify for the dispositive force described in Chevron." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (referencing Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (2000)). For a discussion of
Christensen, see supra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.
229. Id. at 1018 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
231. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
233. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
234. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Hodel v. Virginia Mining, 452 U.S.
264 (1981)). The dissent notes that "federal agencies cannot consign States to the
ministerial tasks of information gathering and making initial recommendations,
while reserving to themselves the authority to make final judgments under the guise
of surveillance and oversight." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 1016 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "ADEC, unlike the majority,
Unfortunately for the dissent, that is exactly the interpretation that the
majority chooses to dismiss. 236
3. ADEC Interpretation
In arguing that the EPA exceeded the scope of its authority in
determining the reasonableness of its BACT determination, ADEC
"assailed" the EPA's statutory interpretation "on several grounds. 237
First, ADEC proffers the argument that the "statutory definition of
BACT" places authority to determine BACT in the State permitting
agency alone.238 As such, ADEC argues that EPA's authority is
properly restricted to ensuring that a PSD permit contain a BACT
determination and not to a review of the substance of such a
determination. 239 Justice Ginsburg responds first by noting that state
agencies are "no doubt" in the best position to "adjust for local
differences" in making BACT determinations that take into account
the relevant economic and environmental concerns that such
determinations must balance.240 Even so, the majority notes that the
language of the statute does not imply that there "can be no
unreasonable determinations. "241 Finding there to be a crucial
distinction between the provisions of the statute and the interpretation
proffered by ADEC, the Court notes that EPA "claims no prerogative
to designate the correct BACT" and only claims "the authority to
guard against unreasonable designations." 242 Responding to ADEC's
interpretation, the majority finds that Congress granted "sweeping"
recognizes that the Act's explicit provision for a preauthorization process
underscores the need for finality in state permitting decisions, making implausible
an interpretation of the statute that would allow a post hoc veto procedure ... Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 1003. "ADEC's argument overlooks the obvious difference
between a statutory requirement ... and a statutory authorization." Id. (emphasis
in original).
237. Id. at 1001.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 999.
240. Id. at 1001. The Court lists adjustment for "local differences in raw
materials or plant configurations" as considerations which might make "a
technology 'unavailable' in a particular area." Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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authority to the EPA to enforce the provisions and requirements of
the CAA and its PSD program. 243  Finding that Congress had
expressly created an "expansive surveillance role" for EPA in other
CAA provisions, 244 the majority sees no basis for finding an implicit
intent of Congress to preclude the EPA from taking steps to
determine the substantive validity of a State's BACT
determination. 245 The Court further dismisses as absurd the idea that
Congress intended only for the EPA to insure that state permitting
authorities utter the magic word "BACT" when issuing their PSD
permits.246 Directly refuting the first argument advanced by ADEC,
Justice Ginsburg concludes that EPA's role in determining the
reasonableness of state agency BACT determinations is "consistent"
with Congressional intent to place the primary burden and
responsibility of CAA enforcement on the states. 24
7
ADEC next advances the argument that the presence of language
expressly requiring EPA approval of a permitting authority's BACT
determination in certain circumstances demands that the Court find
EPA's interpretation in this instance to be unwarranted.248 ADEC
argues that the absence of such express language in this provision of
the CAA is an indication that Congress did not intend to grant EPA
the power to review state agency BACT determinations for
reasonableness.249  Justice Ginsburg dismisses ADEC's second
argument, pointing to its misunderstanding of the "difference
between a statutory requirement ... and a statutory authorization."250
243. Id. at 1002-03.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1003.
246. Id.
247. Id. The Court notes that EPA's interpretation of the act still provides
state agencies "considerable leeway" in the administration of their PSD programs.
Id. EPA will only be authorized to intervene for the purpose of ensuring that
statutory requirements have been met, and such action will be permitted only when
the BACT determination of a state agency is not based on a "reasoned analysis." Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(8) as a requirement and comparing to
sections 113(a) and 167 which the Court believes are authorizations) (emphasis in
original). The Justice also notes that a requirement would demand that the EPA
intervene every time regardless of reasonableness, while an authorization sensibly
grants EPA power to intervene only when state determinations are arbitrary. Id.
The majority notes that Congress sensibly provided EPA with the
authorization, and not the requirement, of acting where a "state
permitting authority has determined BACT arbitrarily. "251
Finally, ADEC argues that even if the CAA can be read to require
state agencies to present a reasoned basis for their BACT
determinations, any such requirement ought to "be enforced only
through state administrative and judicial processes. 252 Placing the
power of review in state judicial entities, ADEC argues, would
ensure the development of an "adequate factual record," "promote
certainty," and properly shift the burden of proving unreasonableness
onto the EPA.253 In rejecting this final argument, the majority first
notes that Congress was unlikely to have intended to limit a federal
agency to the bounds of state court when challenging state agency
action which it determines to be a violation of federal law.254 The
majority also notes that EPA's determination that it is not required to
take "recourse to state processes before stopping a facility's
construction" is a "rational interpretation" of CAA and therefore
permissible. 255  Justice Ginsburg next focuses on the practical
concerns raised by ADEC to bolster its challenge of the interpretation
proferred by the EPA.256
The majority dismisses the concern raised by ADEC regarding
the danger of producing inadequate factual records absent the use of
state administrative and judicial process, noting that no such outcome
occurred in this particular instance.257 As to ADEC's concern with
which party bears the burden of proof, Justice Ginsburg notes that
Congress nowhere provided that the "allocation of proof burdens
would differ depending upon which enforcement route EPA
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1003-04.
253. Id. at 1004.
254. Id. "It would be unusual, to say the least, for Congress to remit a federal
agency enforcing federal law solely to state court. We decline to read such an
uncommon regime into the Act's silence." Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. In this particular case, the majority notes that the Ninth Circuit
ordered EPA to submit a complete administrative record and that "all parties
effectively agreed that the record as it stood was adequate to resolve the issues on
appeal." Id. (quoting Alaska, 298 F.3d at 818).
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selected. 25 s  Further, the Court's "analysis would have taken the
same path" had the suit been filed initially in state court.259 Finally,
the majority rejects ADEC's concern that, absent state courts acting
as the "exclusive judicial arbiters," the EPA could invalidate a
facially valid BACT determination any time after a permit has been
issued. 260  The Court ultimately concludes that EPA would not
indulge in that type of conduct as long as federal courts sit to review
its actions. 261 After determining that the EPA correctly interpreted
the scope of its authority under the provisions of the CAA, Justice
Ginsburg addressed the question of whether the agency's exercise of
that authority was arbitrary or capricious.
262
D. EPA Behavior: Arbitrary or Capricious?
1. Majority Opinion
The Court's review of EPA's behavior under the arbitrary and
capricious standard arose from ADEC's claim that, even if the EPA
properly interpreted the scope of its authority under the CAA
provisions, its exercise of that authority was inappropriate in this
particular case.263  The majority ultimately rejects ADEC's
258. Id. at 1005. "Nothing in our decision today invites or permits EPA to
achieve an unfair advantage through its choice of litigation forum." Id. To put to
rest any fears regarding an improper allocation of the proof burden, the majority
explicitly holds that the "production and persuasion burdens remain with EPA" to
determine "[w]hether the state agency's BACT determination was reasonable, in
light of the statutory guides and the state administrative record." Id.
259. Id. (addressing the concern that EPA's action in issuing the stop orders
was arbitrary and capricious). In finding EPA's behavior permissible, the Court
notes that the agency issued the orders after a review of the same standard which
the Court would have applied: consideration of "whether ADEC's BACT
determination was ... reasonable." Id.
260. Id. Justice Ginsburg notes that the facts of this particular case present "no
such development" and involved orders issued before and not after construction
began. Id. She further indicates that the one cited instance where the EPA failed to
act in a timely manner in issuing a stop construction order resulted in the federal
court refusing to allow enforcement to proceed. Id.; see AM Gen. Corp., 34 F.3d at
475.
261. Id. at 1006 (citing Walz, 397 U.S. at 678-79).
262. Id.
263. Id. The Court notes that ADEC failed to raise this concern in its initial
contention, finding the EPA to have reasonably determined ADEC's
BACT was not based on sufficient evidence. 264 In so holding, Justice
Ginsburg first cites the provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act for the relevant standard of review.265 Determining that EPA's
actions are impermissible only if they are arbitrary or capricious, 2
66
the Court turns to an analysis of the particular actions taken by EPA
in this case.267
While the majority concedes that EPA's orders to ADEC were
"skeletal" and lacking in "ideal clarity," it finds that a reading of
those orders with the letters and other documents exchanged between
EPA and ADEC provides a sufficient foundation for EPA's ultimate
conclusion as to the reasonableness of ADEC's BACT
determination. 268 The Court specifically identifies ADEC's sudden
and inexplicable decision to change its BACT requirement after
protests from Cominco as one of the primary justifications for EPA's
finding of unreasonableness. 269 Having initially concluded that SCR
pleading before the Ninth Circuit. Id. Even so, Justice Ginsburg notes that it is
addressed in the majority's analysis of the larger question of the scope of EPA's
supervisorial authority. Id. "Treating the case-specific issue as embraced within
the sole question presented, we are satisfied that EPA did not act arbitrarily ... 
Id.
264. Id. "[W]e are satisfied that EPA did not act arbitrarily in finding that
ADEC furnished no tenable accounting for its determination that LowNOx was
BACT for MG-17." Id.
265. Id. Noting that the CAA itself does not "specify a standard ... in this
instance," Justice Ginsburg cites 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) as the default standard that
should be applied. Id.
266. Id. The arbitrary or capricious standard requires the Court to ask "whether
the Agency's actions was 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with the law." Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2004)).
Justice Ginsburg further notes that that an agency's decision should not be
disturbed when the process by which that decision was arrived at can be reasonably
discerned. Id. (quoting Bowman, 419 U.S. at 286).
267. Id. at 1006.
268. Id. at 1006-07. After citing the less than ideal character of EPA's three
orders, the Court concludes that a reading of all of the documents together
"adequately ground[s] the determination that ADEC's acceptance of Low NOx for
MG-17 was unreasonable given the facts ADEC found." Id.
269. Id. at 1007. The Court notes that ADEC applied EPA's suggested "top-
down" methodology in making its initial BACT determination for Cominco's new
generator. Id. (quoting App. 65). See supra note 148 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the procedural steps in making a "top-down" BACT determination.
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technology was technically and economically feasible for
Cominco, 270 it is not clear what information guided ADEC's ultimate
decision to approve a cheaper and less effective pollution control
technology. 27' Such ambiguity raises suspicions of impropriety in
light of Cominco's flat refusal to provide any evidence that SCR
technology would not be economically feasible.272 With no "record
evidence" to suggest that requiring SCR would negatively impact
Cominco's "operation[s] or competitiveness, '" 273 the Court found
Using the "top-down" approach, ADEC initially concluded that SCR was both
"technically and economically feasible." Id. at 1007 (quoting App 65). Less than a
month later, ADEC changed its BACT determination to require LowNOX after
Cominco suggested that fitting all of its generators with that technology would
"reduce aggregate emissions." Id. ADEC ultimately abandoned its reduced
aggregate rationale for its switch of BACT technologies, relying instead on the
conclusion that SCR was too expensive. Id. EPA concluded that switch had "no
factual basis in the record." Id. The Court determined that absent any factual basis
for that switch, ADEC could not be said to have acted reasonably in selecting Low
NOx as BACT for the Cominco generator. Id.
270. Id. at 1007.
271. Id. at 1007. "We do not see how ADEC, having acknowledged that no
determination '[could] be made as to the impact of [SCR's] cost on the operation
and competitiveness of the [mine] .... could simultaneously proffer threats to the
mine's operations operation or competitiveness as reasons for declaring SCR
economically infeasible." Id.
272. Id. "Cominco had declined to provide the relevant financial data,
disputing the need for such information and citing 'confidentiality' concerns." Id.
"ADEC's basis for selecting Low NOx thus reduces to a readiness '[t]o support
Cominco's Red Dog Mine Production Rate Increase Project, and its contributions
to the region."' Id. at 1008. That justification fails to meet even ADEC's own
standard of requiring a "source-specific . . . economic impact[t] which
demonstrate[s] [SCRI to be inappropriate as BACT." Id. The first indication of
unreasonable action on the part ADEC is cited as the direct contradiction between
ADEC's determination that SCR was too costly and its initial calculation of the
actual costs of requiring SCR for Cominco's new generator. Id. ADEC initially
determined that the per-ton cost of SCR would be around $2,279. Id. That number
was "'well within what ADEC and EPA consider to be economically feasible."'
Id. (citing App at 138). Even so, after protests from Cominco, ADEC decided that
cost was not something that the mine could reasonably bear. Id. EPA also found
ADEC's comparison of Cominco to a rural utility to be untenable, since no
evidence was presented to suggest that an "incremental1]" increase in the cost of
zinc concentrates would be remotely similar to the need of a rural non-profit utility
to "pass costs on to a small base of individual consumers." Id. (quoting Brief for
Respondents 49).
273. Id. at 1007.
ample justification for EPA's issuance of stop orders premised on the
unreasonableness of ADEC's BACT determination. 27 4  In finding
that the EPA did not exceed the scope of its authority or act
arbitrarily in determining ADEC's BACT selection to be
unreasonable, the majority rejects ADEC's aggregate emission
rationale27 5 and concludes by clarifying the options still available to
ADEC in light of its holding.276
2. Minority Opinion
Starting with the premise that EPA's interpretation of the CAA
statute improperly created supervisory authority that was not
intended by Congress, 277 Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion
274. Id. at 1008. "EPA validly issued stop orders because ADEC's BACT
designation simply did not qualify as reasonable in light of the statutory guides."
Id.
275. Id. at 1009-10. ADEC also attempted to justify its selection of LowNOx
on the grounds that a lower "aggregate" emission could be achieved by requiring
Cominco to install that technology on all of its generators. Id. at 1008. The Court
dismisses that justification altogether, finding that State's may only "treat
emissions from several pollutant sources as falling under one 'bubble"' if all of the
sources are "part of the permit action." Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner 111, 199).
Since MG-17 was the only generator that was part of the permit action, ADEC
could not justify its selection of LowNOx over SCR solely on the attainment of a
lower aggregate emission. Id. at 1009.
276. Id. The Court notes that nothing prevents ADEC from supplementing the
record with evidence supporting a finding that SCR is not economically feasible for
Cominco, and it suggests that EPA would allow ADEC's BACT determination to
stand if such evidence were brought forward. Id. ("EPA repeatedly commented
that it was open to ADEC to prepare 'an appropriate record' supporting its
selection of Low NOx as BACT.") Id. Justice Kennedy's dissent charges the
majority with creating a "Zeno's paradox" for state agencies by which they must
create endless layers of procedure without ever enjoying the certainty of knowing
those procedures will survive the close scrutiny of EPA review. Id. at 1016-17
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Such a state of affairs, the dissent argues, creates the
possibility that State permitting agencies will fail to achieve the ultimate goal of
issuing a permit. Id. at 1016-17 (Kennedy, J., dissenting.) Justice Ginsburg cites
the failure of the dissent to present any instances in which the EPA has "indulged
in... [the] piling of process upon process," and dismisses its fears as lacking any
basis in reality. Id. at 1009 n.21.
277. Id. at 1012 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "As a result, EPA has no statutory
basis to invoke the enforcement authority of §§ 1 13(a)(5) and 167." Id. (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
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disputes the majority's conclusion that EPA's behavior was not a
violation of the arbitrary or capricious standard of administrative
review. 278  Justice Kennedy begins his dissent by noting that the
CAA itself contains protections against "arbitrary and capricious
BACT determinations" by state permitting agencies. 279 Because the
dissent believes that EPA improperly interpreted the CAA
provisions, 8 0 it starts with the premise that EPA's exercise of
authority was arbitrary and capricious from the outset. 281 As such,
Justice Kennedy focuses on the administrative procedures that were
already available to the EPA and its failure to follow those
procedures when challenging ADEC's BACT determination.28 2
Rejecting EPA's argument that it should not be forced to challenge
ADEC's determination in a state court, 283 the dissent notes the
impropriety of "allow[ing] a federal agency to take unilateral action
to set aside a State's administrative decision. 284 The dissent further
notes that the CAA requires states to create an administrative process
whereby interested persons can submit comments. 285 Included within
the definition of "interested persons," Congress explicitly lists the
278. See id. at 1017 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("EPA did not participate in the
administrative process, but waited until after the record was closed to intervene by
issuing an order setting aside the BACT determination").
279. Id. at 1012 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "Before EPA approves a State's
PSD permit program that allows a state agency to make BACT determinations,
EPA must be satisfied that the State provides 'an opportunity for state judicial
review." Id. at 1013 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting 61 Fed. Ref. 1882 (1996)).
The Justice also cites the CAA requirement that a State "must allow 'all interested
persons,' including 'representatives of the [EPA] Administrator,' to submit
comments on...'control technology requirements."' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
7475(a)(2) (2004)).
280. See id. at 10 10-12 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
281. See id. at 1013 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 1013-14 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The CAA provides in relevant
part that "[Alny person who participated in the comment process can pursue an
administrative appeal of the State's decision, followed .. .by judicial review in
state courts." Id. at 1013 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
283. See id. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the EPA that a
federal agency should not be limited to bringing actions in state courts).
284. Id. at 1013 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 1013 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2)
(2004)).
EPA.286 Since the EPA itself requires that states establish procedures
for state judicial review of PSD decisions, "it follows that EPA...
cannot evade ... state process by a mere stroke of the pen under the
agency's letterhead. 287 Further, the responsibility of "ferret[ing] out
arbitrary and capricious conduct by state agencies" properly rests in
state courts and not the EPA.288 Dismissing the majority's belief
that, absent EPA review, no oversight authority of state BACT
determinations would exist,289 Justice Kennedy addresses ADEC's
concern that EPA's conduct improperly shifts the burden of proof.
290
In the eyes of the dissent, the majority's holding will require state
agencies to prove that the EPA acted arbitrarily in issuing a stop
order for what it determines to be an unreasonable BACT
selection. 29' Such a requirement essentially shifts the "burden of
pleading and of initiating litigation from EPA to the State." 292 While
the majority attempts to alleviate concerns raised by the potential
implications of a shifted proof burden, 293 Justice Kennedy finds
286. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Alaska Stat. § 46.14.990(20) (2002)
(defining "person" to include "an agency of the United States").
287. Id. at 1013 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
288. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Indicating that the CAA does not give the
EPA authority to have a "roving commission" to locate and eliminate arbitrary state
determinations. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See Idaho, 521 U.S. at 276
("elaboration of administrative law ... is one of the primary responsibilities of the
state judiciary").
289. Id. at 1014 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy cites the fact that
EPA was not able to identify a single state which did not have a law requiring that
its agencies act rationally. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Further, the existence of
the state courts to review state agency BACT determinations eliminates the
oversight role which EPA alleges is required to achieve the ultimate policy goals of
the CAA. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
290. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
291. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "[C]ourts reviewing EPA's order must ask
not simply whether EPA acted arbitrarily but the convoluted question whether EPA
acted arbitrarily in finding the State acted arbitrarily." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
292. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 1005 n.17. One of ADEC's primary concerns with contesting the
EPA's issuance of a stop order centered on the allocation of the applicable burden
of proof in such an instance. Id. ADEC argued that allowing the EPA to issue a
stop order shifted the burden on to ADEC to prove that its decision was reasonable.
Id. If the EPA were forced to challenge ADEC's action in state court, prior to the
issuance of an order, the EPA would carry the burden of proving that ADEC had
acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Id.
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"little authority" to support its reasoning. 294  The complex and
unusual division of proof burdens which assign one party the burden
of pleading while assigning the other party the burden of production
and persuasion is rejected by the dissent as impractical.295 Further,
the complexity of that burden allocation is likely to encourage EPA
to avoid participating in State administrative process altogether.
296
Justice Kennedy notes that, under the majority's holding, the EPA
needs simply to "issue a unilateral order invalidating... [a] State's
BACT determination" to place all of the relevant burdens on the
State.297 The ease with which that burden is shifted provides no
incentive for administrative agencies to subject themselves to state
administrative processes, and raises the larger constitutional concern
that such agencies will issue a unilateral order after a state court has
found no error or abuse of discretion.
298
Addressing the constitutional concerns raised by ADEC in its
challenge to the EPA's action,2 99 Justice Kennedy argues that
allowing EPA to issue "its own orders nullifying" a "state court's
ruling" improperly alters the balance of power between State and
federal governments as well as the executive and judicial branches.300
The dissenting opinion notes that an analogous grant of power to
review federal court decisions would be a clear constitutional
294. Id. at 1014 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Noting that the authority cited by
Justice Ginsburg is unrelated to the issues in this case. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Justice Kennedy further notes that the very authority cited by Justice
Ginsburg "instructs" that the entity having the burden of pleading will also bear the
burden of persuasion and production. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
295. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
296. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "EPA is most unlikely to follow the
procedure, prescribed by federal law, or participating in the State's administrative
process and seeking judicial review in state courts." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
297. Id. at 1014-15 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy notes that
loophole created by the Majority "demonstrate[s] the inconsistency between its
approach and the statutory scheme." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
298. Id. at 1015 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Citing as a "serious flaw" the
possibility that the EPA could unilaterally invalidate an Alaska state court's
determination that ADEC's BACT determination was lawful and not an abuse of its
discretion. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
299. See id. at 1003-06 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 1015 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Noting the new power allocation to
be a sign of the "implausibility of the majority's reasoning." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
violation, 30 1 and a direct assault to the integrity of "judicial
independence." 30 2 Such a drastic change in the balance of federal
power should only be effected "upon a clear instruction from
Congress," 30 3 and Justice Kennedy finds no such instruction here.
30 4
In fact, the dissent finds that the majority's holding precludes state
agencies from continuing to represent themselves as the "real
governing body" in the enforcement of CAA provisions. 30 5 Justice
Kennedy finds that result to represent a giant "step backward" in
achieving Congress's intent to "grant States a significant stake in
developing and enforcing national environmental objectives."306
Continuing his criticism of EPA's unilateral power to invalidate a
state's BACT determination, Justice Kennedy notes that nothing
exists to prevent the EPA from setting aside that determination
"months, or even years," after it has been made.30 7  Citing the
"reliance and expectation interests" potentially at stake when a party
301. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Noting that a federal agency exercising
"analogous power to review the decision of federal courts" would be in violation of
the rule that the "judgments of Article III courts cannot be revised by the Executive
or Legislative Branches." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
302. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "Judges cannot, without sacrificing the
autonomy of their office, put onto the scales of justice some predictive judgment
about the probability that an administrator might reverse their rulings." Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
303. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "If state courts must live with the insult that
their judgments can be revised by a federal agency, the Court should at least insist
upon a clear instruction from Congress. That directive cannot be found here." Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy also points to case law holding that an
alteration of the balance of power between State and Federal governments requires
that Congress make its intent to do so "unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute." Id. at 1016 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452,460).
304. Id. at 1015 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 1017 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
306. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy notes that the majority
would not have approved an EPA interpretation of the CAA which required that all
BACT permits be submitted to the agency for review. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). In so doing, the "basic structure of the BACT provisions" would be
undercut. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Even so, Justice Kennedy argues, the
majority opinion will produce that exact result in practice, "displac[ing] state
agencies" and "degrad[ing]" their role in CAA enforcement. Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
307. Id. at 1016 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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cannot depend upon the certainty of a facially valid permit, the
dissent finds that Congress could not have "intended" the resulting
uncertainty of the majority's interpretation. 0 8 While the majority
expressed confidence that the EPA would be unable to inequitably
upset reliance and expectation interests when federal courts exist to
supervise its actions, 30 9 the dissent warns state agencies to rely on
that assurance "at their own risk.' 3t0  Believing that adequate
enforcement powers demand investing the EPA with the power to act
at any time, 311 the dissent finds ADEC's certainty concerns to be
persuasive and concludes its opinion by criticizing the additional
options which the majority suggests are available to ADEC after its
holding. 312
V. IMPACT
The long term impact of the Court's decision in Alaska remains
to be seen. While the decision has the potential to broadly affect the
manner in which federal agencies ensure state compliance with
308. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(8) to show that
when Congress provides for EPA involvement, it "directs the agency to act sooner
rather than later").
309. Id. at 1006.
310. Id. at 1016 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent finds the authority cited
by Justice Ginsburg to support her assurance to be weak and wholly unrelated to
the issues in this case. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "The authority [that the
majority] cites for this proposition ...consists of nothing more than a religious
exemption case that is far removed from the issues presented here." Id. (Kennedy,
J., dissenting). It then proceeds to list several authorities which grant the U.S.
government exemption from statutes of limitation or other temporal restraints for
purposes of enforcing a "public right." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting
United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 344 (1988)).
311. Id. at 1016 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Referring to 42 U.S.C. § 7477 and
implying the directive to exercise EPA authority in enforcing CAA provisions "at
any point." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
312. Id. at 1017 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Noting that the majority forces state
agencies into a Zeno's paradox in which they will be incapacitated and utterly
unable to perform the function for which they were established: the issuance of
applicable CAA permits. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "The majority creates a
sort of Zeno's paradox for state agencies. Because there can always be an
additional procedure to ensure that the preceding process was followed, no matter
how many steps States take toward the objective, they may never reach it." Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
federal laws, it is entirely possible that the Court will narrowly read
its holding as applicable only to the specific facts at play in this case.
Assuming that the Court's decision is read to be broadly applicable to
the triangulated relationship between states, federal statutes, and
federal agencies, its impact will likely be felt in the Court's approach
to deference, state autonomy, and the scope of federal agency power.
A. Deference
The Court's decision in Alaska is significant in the context of
administrative law in that it applies what some may consider a new or
broader style of Chevron deference. 313 While the majority opinion
clearly states that Chevron is not applicable, 314 some legal scholars
agree with the dissent that Chevron was applied in Alaska de facto.315
Regardless of Chevron's applicability, the Court's decision embodies
a broad form of judicial deference to statutory interpretation by an
administrative agency.316  In relevant part, the decision fuses
Chevron's two step analysis with recent case law according "cogent"
interpretations 'not [the] products of formal rulemaking"' a
significant degree of respect. 317
The practical impact of the Court's fusion of deference principles
may be the application of sweeping deference to any federal agency
interpretation which is well reasoned and sufficiently convincing.318
313. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Noting the majority gives the EPA "the
very Chevron deference-and more-it says should be denied." Id. (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added). For a discussion of Chevron deference, see supra
notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
314. Id. at 1001.
315. Patrick A. Bousquet, Note, Supreme Court Decisions Allows the EPA to
Flex Its Muscle And Trump State Permitting Authorities, 11 MO. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV., 268, 280 (2004); see also Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1018 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
316. Bousquet, supra note 315, at 280. Some might argue that the deference
applied by the Court "ignores traditional limitations on judicial deference to agency
interpretations of statues." Id. at 268. The deference afforded to the EPA in Alaska
is broader than traditional Chevron deference in that it affords dispositive effect to
agency opinions regardless of their finality. See Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1018
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 1001 (quoting Washington State Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs. v.
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 385 (2003)).
318. Various levels of deference can be given by a court reviewing an
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The Court's decision places a previously unobtainable gold standard
of judicial deference well within the reach of agency officials seeking
deference for products of the administrative process traditionally
precluded from hiding under Chevron's veil. 319 While the degree to
which an agency's interpretation is convincing remains a matter of
judicial discretion, it would be entirely reasonable under Alaska for
an agency administrator to seek Chevron style deference for opinion
letters or other less formal embodiments of an agency's interpretive
capacity. If the Court were to permit such activity, it would eliminate
a substantial degree of judicial oversight from the checks and
balances designed to ensure the exercise of federal agency power
remains within the scope of its constitutional and congressionally
mandated authority.32
0
B. Diminishing State Autonomy
In so far as the Court's holding in Alaska grants broad deference
to virtually all reasonable products of agency decision-making, it
calls into question the autonomy and competence of state agencies
who find themselves in conflict with their federal counterparts. 321
Alaska legitimizes federal preemption of the decision-making
agency's statutory interpretation. See supra notes 90-137 and accompanying text.
Weaker forms of deference, such as Skidmore, place very little authoritative weight
on agency opinions. Id. Chevron deference embodies the strongest form of
deference, requiring courts to defer to qualifying administrative interpretations
regardless of their particular appeal to the judicial palette. Id. Once a court
determines that an agency opinion merits such strong deference, its analysis is
generally concluded. Id.
319. Prior to Alaska, Chevron deference was not available for informal agency
action, including opinion letters, interpretive guides, etc. See supra note 123 and
accompanying text.
320. See Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1018 (Kennedy, J. dissenting) (noting that the
majority's holding "relegate[s] States to the role of mere provinces or political
corporations, instead of coequal sovereigns entitled to the same dignity and
respect").
321. See Bonnie Bridges, Using Alaska v. EPA to Unmask the Clean Air Act,
25 ENERGY L.J. 431, 437 (2004). "This decision is important in interpreting not
only agency authority, but also in balancing the authority of the state against a
federal agency." Id; see also Bousquet, 11 Mo ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. at 281
("[T]his double standard could greatly increase federal agencies' power and
completely vitiate the sovereignty of complimentary state agencies.").
authority of a state agency, calling into question the future autonomy
that such agencies will enjoy.322 In so doing, the Court implicitly
contradicts prior CAA case law affirming the Congressional decision
to make maintenance of national air quality standards the primary
responsibility of state, not federal, agencies.
323
The Court's decision raises grave concerns over the wisdom of
allowing federal agencies to scrutinize the products of policy
decisions based on regional and cultural interests unique to a given
state. 324 Such scrutiny may not always produce results sensitive to a
region's particular social, political, and economic needs. Further, it
raises questions of Constitutional propriety in light of its potential
disregard for state sovereignty. 325 Applied in the extreme, the holding
in Alaska relegates state agencies to subservient roles in which
conflicts between state and federal entities will inevitably be decided
in favor of the dominant federal body. As such, its practical effect
would be to make state agencies into procedural drones devoid of
substantive authority or discretion to determine how a particular
federal standard or mandate will be met.
326
322. See Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1018 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
323. See Train, 421 U.S. at 64 (noting that Congress explicitly "preserved the
principle" that "[e]ach State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air
quality within the entire geographic region comprising such State." (internal
quotations omitted)).
324. See Howard P. Walthall, Jr., Chevron v. Federalism: A Reassessment of
Deference to Administrative Preemption, 28 CuMB. L. REv. 715, 756 (1998).
A federal agency epitomizes the federal government's existence
as a centralized power structure, and has no direct ties to the
states at all. Therefore, the agency will not have the sensitivity to
state interests that Congress does. The agency may be far too
willing to sacrifice state concerns on the altar of federal interests
and national uniformity.
Id.
325. See Bousquet, supra note 315, at 281 for a discussion of the Tenth
Amendment concerns raised by the Court's decision (noting that this Court's
holding "indicates that state sovereignty is, indeed, a 'myth."'); see also Steven G.
Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601 (2002).
326. See Bousquet, supra note 315, at 281 ("even a very narrow interpretation
of the holding [in Alaska] . . . concedes that federal agencies may overrule state
agency action they deem unreasonable without Congress specifically permitting
them to do so.").
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C. Expanding the Scope of Federal Agency Power
While Alaska's impact on the larger issues of judicial deference
and state autonomy remains speculative, the degree to which it
affects the scope of EPA authority can be fairly determined. Prior to
the Court's holding in Alaska, it was unclear whether the EPA
possessed authority to scrutinize the processes by which state
environmental agencies make permit determinations pursuant to their
responsibilities under the CAA.327 Some prior CAA interpretations
envisioned the EPA's role as one of ensuring the required
components were included in permits authorizing new or modified
sources of air pollutants. 328 Under that interpretation, the EPA would
be powerless to attack the substantive process by which a state
determines applicable permit requirements have been met.329  The
Court's holding in Alaska clearly provides the EPA with a much
stronger supervisory authority, 330 authorizing it to invalidate the
BACT determinations of state environmental agencies whenever the
EPA finds them to be unreasonable. 331 Such authority, it has been
argued, threatens the state with "unbridled federal oversight" in
327. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1000.
328. See id. at 1002. ADEC argues that the language of the CAA restricts the
EPA's enforcement role to ensuring that state issued permits "contain a BACT
limitation." Id.
329. See id. "Under ADEC's interpretation, EPA properly inquires whether a
BACT determination appears in a PSD permit .... but not whether that BACT
determination 'was made on reasonable grounds properly supported on the
record."' Id. (quoting Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation
Plans; Commonwealth of Virginia--Prevention of Significant Deterioration
Program, 63 Fed. Reg. 13795, 13797 (March 23, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 502)).
330. See Bousquet, supra note 315, at 280. There is significant support for the
argument that strong enforcement powers are necessary to insure the policy
objectives behind the CAA are met. See Paul G. Rogers, The Clean Air Act of
1970, at http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/caa70/ll.htm (last viewed December
21, 2004). "[T]he 1970 amendments demonstrated Congress' acknowledgement
that air pollution could not be effectively addressed on a regional level." Id. "It
will be critical to keep the pressure on [the states] in order to see to it that those
who are covered by the statute obey it - or pay the requisite penalties for
violations." Id.
331. Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1003.
which "any and all state action could be overridden by federal agency
mandate.,
332
The consequences of granting an expansive interpretation of
EPA's statutory authority reach beyond equipping the EPA with
additional CAA enforcement tools. The implications of the Court's
decision extend to other federal agencies sharing enforcement power
with the states,333 potentially providing them with authorization to
preempt decisions of corresponding state agencies which are not on
par with the federal agency's procedural or policy preferences.
334
Moreover, the Court's holding potentially grants such power to a
federal agency with no requirement that Congress expressly provide
it.335 As such, federal agencies are arguably given an incentive to
interpret ambiguous passages of statutory text to provide them with
broad preemption authority. That incentive could reasonably lead to
a massive expansion in the scope of executive branch authority, 336 an
expansion not met with increased oversight from the judicial and
legislative branches. 337  Further, it may open the door for the
emergence of a "super agency," a federal executive powerhouse with
absolute authority in its given field and a phenomenon wrought with
serious Constitutional concerns. 338
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in Alaska v. EPA has the potential
to broadly affect the field of administrative law. While the majority's
332. Bousquet, supra note 315, at 279.
333. See Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1018 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The CAA is not
the only statute that relies on a close and equal partnership between federal and
state authorities to accomplish congressional objectives.").
334. See Bousquet, supra note 215, at 280.
335. See Walthall, supra note 324, at 756. "[A]gencies should not be trusted
any more than courts are to conduct the delicate balancing of national and local
interests required by our federal system." Id.
336. Administrative agencies are traditionally considered members of the
executive branch.
337. See Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1018 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "This is
inconsistent with the assurance Congress gave to regulated entities when it allowed
state agencies to decide upon the grant or denial of a permit under the BACT
provisions of the CAA." Id. (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
338. See Bousquet, supra note 315, at 279-80.
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opinion equips the EPA with stronger tools for safeguarding the
nation's air quality, it also creates a precedent for expanding the
scope of federal agency power. If found to be applicable to a wide
array of inter-agency conflict between governmental sovereigns, the
Court's decision significantly diminishes the autonomy of state
agencies and allows their federal counterparts to derive broader
enforcement powers than those expressly afforded them by Congress.
The history of the Clean Air Act has demonstrated time and again
the importance of a strong enforcement authority in achieving the
act's policy goals. 339 Allowing the EPA to check unreasonable or
arbitrary permit decisions by state environmental agencies safeguards
against ground level political and economic corruption within those
organizations. Even so, one must find significant credence in the
dissent's concern with the mechanism by which the EPA is permitted
to perform that checking function. 340 Could the EPA be equally
effective challenging arbitrary or unreasonable agency action in state
courts? Are state courts qualified to act as impartial decision makers
or would they be swayed by economic and political interests
particular to their jurisdiction? Does allowing federal agency
preemption violate notions of state sovereignty and rebut the
presumption that state agencies act in good faith when enforcing
federal regulations? The answer to those questions is likely to rest in
future case law as the Court is presented with the opportunity to
clarify the broader legal consequences of its Alaska holding. Until
that clarification occurs, Alaska v. EPA will represent the type of
decision where legally suspect means are employed to achieve
politically noble ends. In the world of legal precedent, means
oriented jurisprudence can have unforeseen and catastrophic legal
ramifications. The degree to which the Alaska decision produces
such consequences is something only time can tell.
339. See generally Rogers, supra note 330.
340. See Alaska, 124 S. Ct. at 1017 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("No matter how
much time was spent in consultation and negotiation, a single federal administrator
can in the end set all aside by a unilateral order.").
